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NOTES
AN EVENHANDED APPROACH TO
DIMINISHING STUDENT PRIVACY
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: VERNONIA
SCHOOL DISTRICT v. ACTON
American hostility to suspicionless searches, as evident in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,1 dates back to the colo-
nial period of American history.2 At that time, English law permitted
various warrantless searches and seizures, administrative in nature,3 with-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement demonstrates a preference
for searches based on suspicion, as opposed to suspicionless searches. Id.; see also Tracey
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 11-13 (1994). Professor Maclin theorizes that the Fourth Amendment was a re-
sponse to a historical period that demonstrated little respect for individual privacy. Id. at
11. To attain more respect for privacy, the Framers, through the Fourth Amendment's
protections, attempted to curb police abuse and discretion by requiring that authorities
execute searches pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. Id. at 13.
.2. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
224-29 (1988) (describing the various suspicionless search methods that were used in Eng-
land and colonial America which angered the citizens and catalyzed the colonists in their
movement towards revolution). Specifically, Levy observes that the colonists often re-
sorted to violent measures to prevent the enforcement of general searches and seizures.
Id. at 228-29. Anarchic crowds frequently intercepted goods seized by enforcement offi-
cials. Id. at 228. In fact, in some of the colonies, these crowds effectively prevented the use
of searches conducted pursuant to general warrants because of the tremendous danger of
violent public opposition. Id. at 229; see also NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 80-82
(1970) (beginning in 1776 with the Virginia Bill of Rights, the colonial states began to
adopt their own Declarations of Rights, providing "freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure" and condemning the issuance of general warrants without probable cause).
3. LEVY, supra note 2, at 224 (arguing that the King "depended on both the general
warrant and warrantless searches as ordinary means of collecting royal revenues"); TEL-
FORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 26 (1969) (observing
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out requiring a showing of suspicion.4 Today, with the growth of the
modern administrative state, suspicionless, administrative searches are
pervading American society once again.5 These searches-random drug
testing,6 sobriety checkpoints, 7 border searches,8 polygraph examina-
tions,9 and metal detector screenings 10-while seeking to advance the
public good, nevertheless, have extracted severe costs from individuals'
that one of the earliest search warrants issued was for unlawfully imported tobacco). Ad-
ditionally, enforcement of duties and taxes often carried supplemental search power. Id. at
29.
4. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 224 (listing the different types of warrantless searches
and noting that in a sample of 108 warrants issued between 1700 and 1763, 106 of them
were general warrants). The executive had authority to issue "writs of assistance" to cus-
toms agents, which broadly empowered them to search and seize any uncustomed goods.
Id. at 227. These writs could be used without a showing of suspicion because they lacked
particularity and "lasted for the life of the sovereign." Id. For a description of an abusive
search performed pursuant to a general warrant, see Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep.
807 (K.B. 1765).
5. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 475-76 (1968) (contending that privacy
intrusions have multiplied in modem society in part through the invasive aspects of mod-
ern electronic devices); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mu-
tual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758-60 (1994)
(arguing that privacy rights "must contend with the changing nature of modern society"
and noting that both governmental and nongovernmental intrusions on privacy continue to
expand).
6. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (upholding random
drug testing of high school and middle school athletes); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding the random drug testing of Customs
agents); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding the
suspicionless drug testing of all railroad employees involved in a railway accident or fatal-
ity). For a concise discussion of the facts and holding in Acton, see Lawrence F. Rossow
and Jacqueline Stefkovich, Vernonia School District v. Acton: Suspicionless Drug Testing,
102 EDUC. L. REP. 897 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (uphold-
ing a suspicionless sobriety checkpoint); United States v. Santiago, 846 F. Supp. 1486, 1489-
92 (D. Wyo. 1994) (noting that sobriety checkpoints present Fourth Amendment constitu-
tional questions).
8. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding suspicionless
searches that occur at fixed checkpoints near the border); see also infra note 50 (providing
an extensive list of Supreme Court cases determining the constitutionality of border and
border-related searches).
9. See Stehney v. Perry, 907 F. Supp. 806, 822 (D.N.J. 1995) (rejecting a claim that a
polygraph test violates the Fourth Amendment).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Vigil, 989 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir.) (holding that a metal
detector test constitutes state action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 205 (1993); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding
airport search of a passenger's carry-on bag after the bag set off a metal detector); United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the argument that a magnetometer
search violated the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); Donald L. Beci,
School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV.
817, 830 (1994) (observing that, among other methods, schools are using metal detectors to
enhance the policing of schools).
1042
19961 Student Privacy Rights 1043
privacy interests in our society."' In effect, an inherent conflict exists be-
tween the modern state, with its technological advancements, and the pri-
vacy interests of the individual.'" The resolution of this conflict has
become one of balancing, attempting to embrace the individual's privacy
interest, while simultaneously allowing the government to seek legitimate
ends in furtherance of the public good.' 3
In striking this balance, various factors may tilt the scale to one side or
the other. For instance, in times of threat and crisis, the balance may tilt
in favor of the government because of the perceived exigency facing the
government in surmounting a crisis.' 4 Of course, by tilting this balance,
the other side, the individual's privacy and other civil liberties, necessarily
suffers.'" While in the past threats to national security have weakened
individual rights,1 6 presently, drugs pose a similar threat. 17  Conse-
11. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1018-19 (1995) (citing regulatory searches as one area where the gov-
ernment is allowed to intrude into individual privacy interests); Sundby, supra note 5, at
1768 (observing that where a court finds a search reasonable, the intrusion of the search
does not disappear, but rather becomes justifiable, and thus a part of everyday life).
12. Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1017 (noting that a natural conflict exists between privacy
and the administrative state, because criminal law enforcement and government regulation
need private information to perform their functions); see Fried, supra note 5, at 475 (noting
that sophisticated scientific devices have intruded upon previously private areas); Sundby,
supra note 5, at 1758-60 nn.27-32 (describing how technological advancements continue to
infringe upon private information).
13. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (ruling that a reasonable search may
require an "individual [to] give up some part of his interest in privacy and security to
advance the community's vital interests in law enforcement"); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (concluding that both the private and public interests must be
accommodated in the balancing test).
14. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 27-31 (1994) (arguing that government reaction to
perceived threats, such as the "War on Drugs," usually takes its toll on individual liberty).
15. See id.; infra note 197 and accompanying text (stating Justices O'Connor, Mar-
shall, and Brandeis' beliefs that government crises result in contractions of individual
liberties).
16. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105
(1943) (same). Subversive political groups within the country also have exacted costs on
individual liberty. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (allowing limi-
tations on an individual's First Amendment rights because of the perceived threat involv-
ing the Communist Party's presence in this country).
17. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 101(2), 84 Stat. 1242, 1242
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994)) (declaring that "controlled substances have a substan-
tial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people"); 46
U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (declaring that international drug trafficking "presents a specific
threat to the security and societal well-being of the United States"); 10 U.S.C. § 374(a)
(1994) (permitting the Secretary of Defense to make equipment and personnel available to
Federal law enforcement agencies to enforce the Controlled Substances Act); 10 U.S.C.
§ 381 (1994) (enabling the Department of Defense to establish procurement procedures to
allow local governments to purchase Department of Defense equipment to combat drug
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1041
quently, individual liberty and privacy interests have suffered greatly at
the hands of the government during the "War on Drugs."18
In Vernonia School District v. Acton,19 the toll that the "War on Drugs"
has extracted became unavoidably clear.2 ° In Acton, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a school district's ran-
dom drug testing program that mandated that all student athletes per-
form monitored urinalyses.2' The school district gave two reasons for
testing only athletes: their position as role models in the school and com-
munity and their alleged role in the school's drug problem. 22 The Court
ruled that the urinalysis minimally intruded upon student's privacy. 23 Af-
ter finding that student athletes have a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy,24 the Court ruled that the government had a compelling interest in
quelling the school district's drug problem and preventing any drug-in-
duced athletic injuries. 25 Balancing these interests, the Court concluded
that the government's interest outweighed the individual athlete's, thus
justifying the suspicionless drug test as reasonable and therefore
constitutional.26
activity); see also 55 Fed. Reg. 29,882 (1990) (announcing the date of the Army Science
Board closed meeting to discuss using military technology to aid in the "National War on
Drugs"); Eric G. Zajac, Tenancies by the Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the
Crime Abuse Prevention and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 553, 553-
54 (1993) (noting the increased role the Federal government has played in attempting to
prevent the flow of illegal drugs into this country).
18. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the. War on
Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1389-91 (1993) (contending that the Bill of Rights is a
casualty of the War on Drugs and noting the likely continued erosion of civil liberties
under the "'semi-martial state' " of our nation) (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, A Critical
Look at the National Drug Control Strategy, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 75 (1990)); Maclin,
supra note 1, at 33-34 (contending that the Fourth Amendment is "the most serious casu-
alty in the 'War on Drugs' "); Steven Witosky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Excep-
tion" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987) (contending that all three
constitutional branches have participated in weakening fundamental rights as a result of
fighting illegal drug use).
19. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
20. See Tracey Maclin, Court is Off Base on Student Drug Tests, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9,
1995, at A32 (arguing that "dragnet searches of innocent student athletes will not solve our
drug problems[ ]" and concluding that the Court "has let the rhetoric of the 'War on
Drugs' overtake its good sense").
21. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388-90.
22. Id. at 2388-89; see infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (explaining the school
district's rationale for exclusively testing athletes at Vernonia's schools).
23. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
24. Id. at 2392; see infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales
the majority employed in ,concluding that students have a diminished expectation of
privacy).
25. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
26. Id. at 2396.
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Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented,
criticizing the majority for disregarding the historical and jurisprudential
importance of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment analysis.2 7
From a historical standpoint, Justice O'Connor asserted that the Framers
conceived the Fourth Amendment in reaction to England's abuse of gen-
eral warrants and other blanket-type searches that lacked individualized
suspicion. 8 From a jurisprudential standpoint, Justice O'Connor argued
that the Court always has emphasized some requirement of suspicion and
has allowed suspicionless searches only in narrowly defined, exceptional
cases.2 9 Noting the benefits of individualized suspicion, Justice O'Connor
rationalized that requiring individualized suspicion would minimize the
intrusiveness of the search, while maintaining the school's stated goal of
curing the perceived drug problem.3"
This Note examines the evolution of the balancing test that the
Supreme Court has applied in analyzing the constitutionality of adminis-
trative searches. First, this Note traces this evolution, beginning with mu-
nicipal housing inspections and ending with mass, suspicionless drug
27. Id. at 2397-2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2398-99. Noting the broad aspect of the search, Justice O'Connor rebuked
the majority for classifying the search as unintrusive. Id. at 2403. She further recounted
historical examples supporting her contention that the Framers required individualized sus-
picion to protect the privacy of the colonists, concluding that, "[pirotection of privacy, not
evenhandedness, was then and is now the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
2399; see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. Rv. 483, 528 (1995) (arguing that
history demonstrates that individualized suspicion is a necessary element of Fourth
Amendment analysis); Maclin, supra note 1, at 9-12 (contending that the historical events
before and immediately after the ratification of the Fourth Amendment provide support
for the theory that the Framers intended to require individualized suspicion as a prerequi-
site to a reasonable search).
29. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor pointed out
that even where the Court did not require some form of suspicion it, nevertheless, built
individualized suspicion into the exceptions. Id. at 2401; see Skinner v.. Railway Labor
Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (holding "where the privacy interests impli-
cated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered
by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion,
a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion") (emphasis added);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab. 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (repeating
the Skinner test).
30. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted
that a suspicion-based search policy would reduce drastically the number of students tested
and also would enable students to alter their conduct and thereby avoid being tested. Id.
Accordingly, the aggregate intrusiveness of the search arguably would be much lower. Id.;
see infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text (explaining the various criticisms the dissent-
ers presented regarding the majority's disregard for individualized suspicion); cf. infra note
301 and accompanying text (explaining that a suspicionless search forces individuals to
forego legitimate activity because the only way to avoid the search is to avoid the activity).
1996] 1045
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testing. Next, this Note summarizes this jurisprudence, explaining the an-
alytical framework that these cases establish. This Note then analyzes the
majority and dissenting opinions in Acton. It argues that the elastic defi-
nition of "compelling" created by Justice Scalia improperly dilutes the
few remaining protections that the Fourth Amendment affords individu-
als subjected to administrative searches. Noting that privacy protections
remain vigorous in other areas of the Fourth Amendment as well as other
areas of constitutional law, this Note next proposes the adoption of the
balancing test employed in substantive due process and equal protection
cases involving the right to privacy. This Note concludes that Acton con-
tinues the decline of Fourth Amendment rights, by both expanding the
definition of compelling and by continuing to minimize individual privacy
rights.
I. THE GROWTH OF BALANCING IN THE ANALYSIS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment protects all citizens, both criminals and non-
criminals from unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus guarantees
all individuals a zone of privacy.31 While seemingly affording this protec-
tion to all citizens, the Court analyzes searches differently under the
Fourth Amendment, depending on their criminal or administrative pur-
pose. 32 Administrative searches, because they often present special
needs that render the warrant or probable cause requirements impracti-
cal, only have to be reasonable to pass constitutional muster.3 3 To be
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government and makes no mention of the purposes of such
searches. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from intrusions posed by administrative searches).
The Camara Court also observed that it would be anomalous to hold that the Fourth
Amendment protected individuals only in the context of criminal behavior. Id. at 530.
32. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (noting that the general rule in criminal cases is that for a
search to be reasonable a warrant supported by probable cause must be issued). For a list
of cases, supporting the fact that the Court favors a warrant supported by probable cause
in criminal cases, see infra note 184. Beginning with Camara, the Court has consistently
noted that administrative searches, while constituting a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment, nevertheless, do not require a warrant supported by probable cause. Camara, 387
U.S. at 534-37; Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
33. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (waiving the warrant and probable
cause requirement when exceptional circumstances in which " 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement make the ... probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble' ") (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment)). Founded upon the "impractical" rationale, the special needs requirement
functions as a threshold-a prerequisite to applying the reasonableness standard. New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987) (opining that requiring a warrant would interfere
with the state's interest in deterring automobile theft); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (eliminating
[Vol. 45:10411046
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reasonable, these searches must represent a government need that
counterbalances, or outweighs, the intrusion the search inflicts upon the
privacy interest of the individual.34
A. Shifting the Focus to Reasonableness: Regulatory Inspections
1. The Birth of Balancing: Municipal Housing Inspections
In Frank v. Maryland,35 the United States Supreme Court held that a
health inspector's search of a home, pursuant to the Baltimore City Code,
did not deprive the homeowner of due process of law.3 6 In so holding,
the majority considered the purpose, the intrusiveness, and the need for
the search.37 Because the housing inspection was to insure safe commu-
nity living standards, was based on a justifiable suspicion that a nuisance
existed, and was not to seize evidence for criminal prosecution, the Court
rationalized that the search did not impinge significantly on Frank's lib-
erty interests.38 Furthermore, the magnitude of the need for safety in-
the warrant requirement because a warrant would unnecessarily hinder the school's ability
to execute swift, responsive disciplinary measures); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (allowing a suspicionless search because of the impracticality of re-
quiring suspicion at a border-related checkpoint search); see infra note 112 (presenting
criticisms of the special needs exception).
The special needs exception is one of approximately 20 exceptions to the warrant or
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of
the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (enumerating these 20
exceptions and the cases in which the courts created them).
34. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. This case engendered the balancing test. See infra
notes 45-108 and accompanying text (analyzing most of the seminal cases that employ the
balancing test in evaluating the reasonableness of an administrative search).
35. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled in part by, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
36. Id. at 373. Frank denied entry to a health inspector who was responding to com-
plaints from petitioner's neighbors regarding the presence of vermin. Id. at 361. Upon
discovering a large pile of straw, trash, and rodent feces in petitioner's backyard, the health
inspector arrested Frank, pursuant to the City's municipal code. Id. at 362. The inspector
estimated that the pile of trash approximated a "half a ton," and because of its attractive-
ness to vermin, constituted a public nuisance. Id. at 361.
Frank argued that the City ordinance violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process, which guarantees him the right to be free from arbitrary government intrusion.
Id. at 362. Nonetheless, Frank could have relied on the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment covers searches that local government officials execute, because the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from arbitrary government invasion is implicit in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus enforceable against the states and
their governments. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled in part by, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. Frank, 359 U.S. at 366-72.
38. Id. at 366-67. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, theorized that Frank
had a duty to act in the community's best interest notwithstanding the city's ordinance, and
thus did not have a liberty interest justifying his refusal of consent to the search. Id. at 366.
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spections vitiated the individual's liberty interest.39 Thus, in effect, the
Court, without labeling it as such, participated in a balancing analysis,
weighing the utility of the administrative need against the gravity of the
individual liberty.4 °
The Supreme Court partially overruled Frank in Camara v. Municipal
Court;41 holding that municipal inspections constituted searches under
It is important to note how the Court uses the purpose of the search inconsistently. In
some cases, the purpose of the search affects the Court's constitutional analysis of the
search. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1984) (concluding that the purpose
of the search dictated the constitutional permissibility of the scope of the search); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) (holding that an inspection to determine a fire's origin
requires a warrant based only on sufficient administrative standards, whereas the same
search conducted as part of a criminal investigation requires a warrant supported by prob-
able cause): Camara, 387 U.S. at 534 (ruling that, because of the different nature of an
administrative search, probable cause was not required).
Of course, as Tyler and Clifford point out, the line dividing a criminal and administrative
search may be very fuzzy. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 724-26 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (contending that the State pretextually used a statute regulating the vehicle
dismantling industry "solely to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing").
In other areas of Fourth Amendment analysis, the purpose of the search does not affect
the Court's decisionmaking. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (con-
cluding that an employment-related search should be judged by reasonableness regardless
of whether the search was for work-related purposes or for investigatory purpose of dis-
covering employee misconduct); see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 (concluding that the
Fourth Amendment applies to a search regardless of its purpose).
Logically, the purpose of the search should not affect the nature of the search or the
nature of the privacy interest that is implicated. Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1057-58. For
example, the same search occurs and the same privacy interests are implicated where a
government agent inspects an individual's credit history to determine financial responsibil-
ity or criminal fraud. See id. at 1058. Furthermore, Professor Stuntz contends that the
bifurcated treatment that results from differentiating searches by their purpose has engen-
dered a perverse double standard in Fourth Amendment law. See id. Thus, in a criminal
search, a minimal privacy interest may be sufficient to outweigh the government's arguably
robust interest in law enforcement; while in a regulatory search, the government's compar-
atively weaker interest in government administration may overcome a heightened privacy
interest. See id.; see also Clancy, supra note 28, at 595-96. The author argues that the
purpose of the search has no effect on its intrusiveness. Id. He states, "the governmental
purpose is important in assessing the legitimacy and strength of the governmental interest;
it is not a relevant consideration in distinguishing between like intrusions. The intent of
the intruder does not distinguish one intrusion from another." Id.
39. Frank, 359 U.S. at 370-72. The Court found that modern urbanization and the
growth of populations exacerbated the need for safety and health inspections in urban
areas. Id. at 371-72.
40. Id. at 365-66 (observing that the Fourth Amendment guarantees an individual's
right to be secure from unwarranted governmental invasion, yet concluding that the non-
criminal purpose of the search and the minimal intrusiveness of it overcame Frank's pri-
vacy rights); see infra note 45 (arguing that the need and intrusiveness factors contained in
balancing analysis originated partly from Frank).
41. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
1048
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the Fourth Amendment,42 and thus required search warrants.43 Never-
theless, noting the broad, general nature of an administrative inspection
search, the Court ruled that a warrant for an administrative search does
not require probable cause.44 Instead, the Court created the balancing
test, weighing individual privacy interests and competing governmental
interests,4 5 to judge whether the search was reasonable and thus constitu-
42. Id. at 530. Refuting the argument that the Fourth Amendment applies only to
criminal searches, the Court stated, "[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and
his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individ-
ual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id.
43. Id. at 534. Requiring a warrant, the Court, nevertheless, observed that administra-
tive inspection searches differ in nature from searches that seek criminal prosecution, in
that, a search made pursuant to criminal prosecution usually is specific, while an adminis-
trative search involves a more generalized search covering an entire neighborhood. Id. at
535; see supra note 38 (discussing the relevance of the purpose of the search in regard to
the constitutional analysis of the search).
44. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. The Court ruled that the inspectors did not need
specific knowledge of the dwelling's condition to conduct the search, and therefore the
Court did not require particularized suspicion. Id. at 538. In dismissing the probable cause
requirement, the Court rationalized that only periodic building inspections could insure
city-wide compliance. Id. at 535-36. Thus, requiring probable cause would slow the in-
spection process and hamper the deterrent effect. Id. at 536. In this way, the Court recog-
nized the governmental need for the search. But see Frank, 359 U.S. at 373 (arguing that
requiring anything less than probable cause creates a "synthetic search warrant"); Clancy,
supra note 28, at 546-47. Mr. Clancy argues that the general showing required in Camara
was the first departure from the individualized suspicion required in prior case law. Id. at
547. In addition, the author criticized the Court's justification of the elimination of individ-
ualized suspicion because of the necessity of universal compliance:
"One might as cogently argue that there is a need for universal compliance with
the criminal law and that the public interest demands that all dangerous offenders
be convicted and punished. It is certainly not a novel observation that in the field
of criminal law this argument has not prevailed, and that instead we are commit-
ted to a philosophy tolerating a certain level of undetected crime as preferable to
an oppressive police state."
Id. at 615 (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.1(b), at 604 (1987)).
45. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (em-
ploying balancing analysis to assess the reasonableness of a search); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (articulating the balancing test as consisting of "the individual's
legitimate expectations of privacy" and "the government's need for effective methods to
deal with breaches of public order").
Balancing the interests, the Court concluded that the history of the search procedure,
the doubtfulness of other techniques rendering acceptable results, and the minimal intru-
siveness of the search all amounted to a reasonable search. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. Note
that these factors, specifically the need for the search and the intrusiveness of the search,
were part of the analysis in Frank. Frank, 359 U.S. at 366-372. In addition, these factors,
or some derivative of them, are used throughout the case law in varying fashions. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 218-19 (2d ed. 1992)
(analyzing each factor used in Camara and individually criticizing the rationale supporting
each factor).
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tional under the Fourth Amendment.46 Therefore, the Court engendered
a new constitutional analysis of the Fourth Amendment.47
The balancing test quickly proliferated beyond municipal safety inspec-
tions to other areas of search and seizure law.48  For example, the
Supreme Court and various lower courts have since used the balancing
analysis to analyze searches involving closely regulated industries,49 bor-
46. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. The Court determined reasonableness "by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Id. at 537.
Using both the balancing test and the reasonableness standard, Justice White rational-
ized that, where the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant, probable cause constitutes the
test of reasonableness. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. To follow this rationale, one must read
the first and the second clauses of the Fourth Amendment together, adhering to the view
that the second clause merely serves as an example of a reasonable search and seizure.
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that the express language of the Fourth Amendment merely forbids unreasonable searches
and seizures): TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 43 (contending that the history of the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates that a search does not always have to be justified by a warrant
supported by probable cause); Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 761-65 (1994) (adhering to Professor Taylor's historical analysis and
contending that the express language of the Fourth Amendment does not require a war-
rant or probable cause). Contra Maclin, supra note 1, at 21 (contending that reading the
Reasonableness Clause apart from the Warrant Clause could render the Warrant Clause
"'virtually useless' ") (quoting JACOB LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 44 (1966)); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
HARV L. REV. 820, 823-26 (1994) (subscribing to a more dynamic interpretation of the
Constitution and noting that only the most pristine originalists fail to consider the effects of
modern society in their historical interpretation of the Constitution). For an excellent sum-
mary of the two divergent views of interpreting the first two clauses of the Fourth Amend-
ment, see Clancy, supra note 28, at 517-26 and Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth
Amendment's Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989).
47. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. Until Camara, balancing analysis did not exist in
the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31
(1968) (upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless pat down and brief seizure of a
suspect where the police had reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed). While
Camara engendered the balancing test, Terry applied it in the context of criminal searches.
Id. at 21. Therefore, Terry and its progeny have proliferated and substantiated the use of
Fourth Amendment balancing analysis.
48. See infra notes 49-53 (providing a summary of cases using balancing analysis to
determine the constitutionality of administrative searches).
49. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708-12 (1987) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of warrantless inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses because the automo-
bile junkyards satisfied the closely regulated industry exception of the Fourth
Amendment); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600-02 (1981) (upholding the constitution-
ality of warrantless federal inspections of mines, because of the history of regulating the
mine industry and the government's substantial interest in mine safety); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (upholding the warrantless search of a gun shop during
business hours because the search minimally threatened privacy interests and had limited
potential for government abuse); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72,
77 (1970) (holding that Congress has broad authority to create reasonable standards for
searches in order to regulate the liquor industry, which has a long history of regulation);
see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 324 (1978) (distinguishing Colonnade
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der-related activities,5" vehicle use,51 and other administrative searches
involving the schools5" and the workplace.53
and Biswell as closely regulated industries and holding that this broad, warrantless search
authorized by OSHA regulations amounted to an unconstitutional searches).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (hold-
ing that reasonable suspicion of alimentary canal drug smuggling justified a warrantless,
sixteen-hour detention of a suspect at a location equivalent to the border); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (upholding a brief, suspicionless, warrantless
stop at a fixed checkpoint located 75 miles from the border); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891, 896 (1975) (holding that a random search of a private vehicle at a traffic check-
point, in which the officers possessed a high level of discretion, was constitutionally imper-
missible); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975) (holding that,
under the Fourth Amendment, a roving border patrol may not stop a motorist near the
border solely on the basis of the Mexican ancestry of the motorist); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (holding that a roving border patrol that conducted
a warrantless, suspicionless search of a motorist's automobile 25 miles from the border
constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
51. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that a
brief detention at a sobriety checkpoint did not violate the motorists' Fourth Amendment
rights); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that a warrantless, random
stop of a motorist to check whether the driver had a valid license and registration violated
the Fourth Amendment).
52. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (holding that
the random, suspicionless drug testing of high school and middle school student athletes is
constitutionally permissible); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985) (holding that a
principal's search of a student's purse, absent probable cause, did not violate Fourth
Amendment); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318-22 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that random urinalysis drug testing of student athletes and cheerleaders was
reasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment); Brooks v. East Chambers
Cons. Ind. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (finding that suspicionless drug
testing of seventh to twelfth grade students who participated in extra-curricular activities,
such as the Future Farmers of America, violated the Fourth Amendment).
53. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672
(1989) (holding that requiring a Customs agent, who is seeking a promotion that will in-
volve handling firearms and being involved in drug interdiction, to submit to a urinalysis is
constitutionally permissible); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
633 (1989) (holding that the mandatory drug testing of railway employees after a train
accident or fatality is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment); O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (applying the reasonableness standard to a search of a state
employee's desk and file cabinets for evidence of office misconduct); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 527
(9th Cir. 1992) (upholding urinalysis of maintenance workers at a nuclear power plant);
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
that the Army's mandatory drug testing policy of civilian employees involved in aviation
did not violate the employees' Fourth Amendment rights), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056
(1990). For a list of Fourth Amendment cases employing the balancing test, see T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987)
(listing the many ways that balancing has been used within Fourth Amendment analysis);
Louis G. Alonso, Jr., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, 1993-94, 83 GEO. L.J. 665, 675-76 (1995) (pro-
viding a very broad overview of what constitutes a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and supporting this overview with a comprehensive list of cases); Greg Knopp
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2. Diminishing Expectations of Privacy: Closely Regulated Industry
Inspections
The Court, in See v. City of Seattle,5 4 a decision delivered the same day
as Camara, extended the holding in Camara to workplaces by requiring a
warrant for business inspections." In New York v. Burger,56 however,
after ruling that the search involved a closely regulated industry,57 the
Court proceeded to uphold a warrantless, administrative search.58 The
et al., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, 1993-94, 83 Gko. L.J. 692 (1995) (providing an overview of
warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment).
54. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
55. Id. at 545.
56. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
57. Id. at 700-02. To determine whether an industry is closely regulated, the Court
assesses the duration of government regulation in the industry. Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). The closely regulated industry exception is often
used synonymously with the pervasively regulated industry exception. However, these ra-
tionales, while similar in their effect of relaxing Fourth Amendment protections, are actu-
ally two different exceptions. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271
(1973) (describing each rationale and finding each rationale inapplicable to border-related
searches). The pervasively regulated industry exception depends on the extent of regula-
tion within the industry. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972) (finding the
gun and ammunition industry to be pervasively regulated).
After reviewing the closely regulated industry cases, the Burger court held that the dura-
tion or history of the government's regulation of the industry supported the conclusion that
the junkyard was a closely regulated industry. Id. at 705-06; see also Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (ruling that the duration of the regulatory scheme was one factor
that indicated whether an industry was closely regulated). Thus, the Court uses the history
of the search to explain its reduction of the individual's expectation of privacy. See Burger,
482 U.S. at 700 (holding that the history of close regulation prevents the business owner
from possessing a reasonable expectation of privacy). But see id. at 719, 722 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority turns the closely regulated industry exception into
the rule by improperly concluding that a vehicle dismantling business has a history of close
regulation by the government).
58. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-12. Balancing the expectation of privacy against the gov-
ernment's interest in regulating the vehicle dismantling industry, the Court held that the
State's interest outweighed the individuals, rendering the search reasonable. Id. More
specifically, the Court created a three-part test to analyze reasonableness in closely regu-
lated industry cases. Id. at 702-03. These factors largely reflect the three factors used in
Camara: government need, no other means achieving acceptable results, and minimized
intrusiveness. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
First, the government must show a substantial interest justifying the search. Burger, 482
U.S. at 702. Second, the inspection "must be 'necessary to further [the] regulatory
scheme.' " Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)). The Court accepted
the State's argument that regulating the dismantling industry will close markets for stolen
vehicles and therefore deter car theft. Id. at 709. Moreover, as in Camara, the Court
reasoned that requiring a warrant would unnecessarily hamper the state's efforts in frus-
trating automobile theft. Id. at 710. Thus, while Camara argued that requiring probable
cause would hinder the State's interest in deterrence, the Court in Burger argued that
requiring a warrant would undermine deterrence. Id.; see supra note 44 (explaining that
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closely regulated industry doctrine serves two functions. First, the search
need only be reasonable to be upheld.59 Second, because the business is
closely regulated, entrepreneurs in the industry, have a diminished expec-
tation of privacy. 6° Hence, the "close regulation" rationale provided one
method for the Court to diminish individual expectations of privacy. 6'
B. Rejecting the Least-Intrusive Means: Checkpoint Searches
Perhaps persuaded by the rationale that individuals entering the coun-
try surrender some, if not all,62 of their Fourth Amendment rights at the
requiring probable cause for a housing inspection would vitiate the deterrent effect of the
inspection, because it would hinder the government's ability to inspect such dwellings
periodically).
Third, the statute must create " 'a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.'"
Id. at 703 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603)). By requiring an adequate substitute for a
warrant, the Court demands that the state limit the intrusiveness of the search by curtailing
the discretion of the official executing the search. Id. at 711. Thus, the potential for abuse
of discretion and the resulting severe intrusiveness that this abuse presents is minimized.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (explaining that the Court has circum-
scribed the discretion of the executing official, when a threat of unconstrained discretion
existed in the search procedure). But see Clancy, supra note 28, at 620-21 (arguing that the
statute in Burger does not offer much guidance; hence, it does not adequately limit the
discretion of the inspectors); Lynn S. Searle, Note, The "Administrative" Search from
Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 288
(1989) (noting that under the New York statute a police officer conducting the search may
"single out a vehicle dismantler or junk yard dealer and put him out of business, either by
harassing him with constant inspections or by arresting him for refusing an inspection").
59. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700-02.
60. Id. at 702; see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (ruling that a
businessman should expect inspections of his business records, when he enters a perva-
sively regulated industry, such as the ammunition and gun industry). In effect, the Court
portends that the individual impliedly consents to the administrative search by entering the
sphere of regulation. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 221 (criticizing the closely
regulated industry line of cases for conveying an assumption of implied consent); Searle,
supra note 58, at 267 (noting that implied consent among other rationales has been used by
the Court in upholding administrative searches). Searle demonstrates the logical weakness
of this "implied consent" theory by extending it to its logical conclusion:
First, if it is the notice provided by pervasive regulation that reduces one's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy, then any time notice is given, a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy diminishes, and her fourth amendment protections evapo-
rate. Taken to its logical extreme, this argument asserts that any time a legislature
passes a statute authorizing warrantless searches ... the public is on notice that
the searches will be made, and consequently has no reasonable expectation of
privacy. This is essentially the argument advanced in ... Burger.
Id. at 280.
61. See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text (explaining how the "close or perva-
sive regulation" rationale has been extended to cover not only entrepreneurs, but also
workers and athletes).
62. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (allowing the
warrantless, sixteen-hour detention of an individual suspected of smuggling drugs into the
country in her alimentary canal). During this period, the police held the petitioner in
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border,63 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,64 found
a search conducted at a permanent checkpoint, established to prevent the
infiltration of illegal aliens, constitutionally permissible.65 In Martinez-
Fuerte, the Court articulated several novel principles regarding the consti-
tutionality of an administrative search.66 First, the open and systematic
nature of the intrusion worked to reduce the fright and surprise of motor-
ists, lowered their expectation of privacy, and minimized the intrusiveness
of the search.67 Second, for a search to be permissible, the government is
order to monitor her bowel movements, with the hope of discovering smuggled drugs. Id.
at 534-35. In the end, the petitioner submitted to a rectal examination in which a physician
removed a balloon filled with cocaine from her rectum. Id. at 535. Despite a painfully
valiant effort, the petitioner defecated eighty-eight balloons over the course of four days,
and consequently was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at
535-36; cf. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 221. The authors postulate, that the
Court's underlying rationale for diminishing individuals's privacy interest may be that "cer-
tain privileges... may be conditioned upon the surrender of Fourth Amendment rights."
Id. The authors criticize the Court for conveying this assumption. Id.
63. The border includes not only the physical boundary of the United States, but also
its functional equivalent. See United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73
(1973) (border search includes searches performed at an international airport); United
States v. Dobson, 781 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1986) (border searches include searches
performed on a boat originating from international waters which has entered United States
territorial waters).
64. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
65. Id. at 566. The Court upheld this search, despite the fact that the checkpoint was
located 75 miles inland. Id. at 558. But see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975)
(disallowing a fixed checkpoint that investigated all cars, yet searched a small number of
vehicles based completely on the officials' discretion). Martinez-Fuerte is distinguishable
from Ortiz, in that the officers at the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte only asked a few ques-
tions as part of their search. Hence, the search was less intrusive. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 558.
66. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-59. Upholding the search, the Court still relied
on previously enunciated factors. Id. at 554-60. The Court's factors were: the expectation
of privacy of the individual, the amount of intrusiveness of the search, the effectiveness of
the search method, and the amount of discretion of the officers performing the search. Id.
The Court balanced these to determine the reasonableness of the search. Id. at 566. Fol-
lowing the basic balancing test of Camara, the Court concluded that the need for these
fixed checkpoints was great, while the intrusion thrust upon the individual's privacy was
minimal. Id. at 557; see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990)
(adhering to Martinez-Fuerte, and holding that the balancing test and reasonableness stan-
dard should be used to analyze the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint).
67. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. First, the Court found that the fixed and open
nature of these checkpoints works to decrease the individual's expectation of privacy be-
cause motorists know the location of these checkpoints and should not be surprised by the
officials stopping vehicles at these checkpoints. Id. But see Searle, supra note 58, at 280
(criticizing the logic of the Court in Burger, where the majority reasoned that notice of a
search works to reduce an individual's expectation of privacy, because the individual know-
ingly enters a sphere of regulation).
Second, the Court stated "[t]he regularized manner in which established checkpoints are
operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
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not required to utilize the least-restrictive means in conducting the
search.68 Third, the Court held that requiring a search to be based on
reasonable suspicion was "impractical" because it eradicated the deter-
rent effect of the search.69 Of course, since enunciating these factors,
they have become part of the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.70
authorized and believed to serve the public interest." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
The regularized manner not only minimizes fright, but also assures the motorist that the
search is being performed by authorized officials in a regulated manner. Id. As in Burger,
the Court reasoned that by limiting the discretion of the government official, the govern-
ment theoretically minimizes the intrusiveness of the search because lowering the discre-
tion of the official lowers the chance for abuse of discretion. See id.; Burger, 482 U.S. at
711 (theorizing that a constitutionally sufficient statute lowers the discretion of the en-
forcement official, simultaneously assuring the entrepreneur that the search is conducted
pursuant to a valid statute and notifying the entrepreneur that she is subject to a regulatory
search). A lower chance for abuse of discretion consequently lowers the chance of a severe
intrusion. See supra note 58 (noting that the courts generally require some form of limita-
tion on the officials' discretion in upholding the search).
It is important to note that the "limited discretion equals minimal intrusiveness" theory
limits only the potential for severe intrusiveness. See Searle, supra note 58, at 288. In
reality, a search is equally intrusive whether it is performed with broad discretion or exe-
cuted pursuant to a precisely detailed statute. See id. For instance, the intrusiveness to an
individual's bodily integrity is the same where a government official forces an individual to
submit to a strip search, regardless of whether that official is acting on his own initiative or
pursuant to the most exacting state regulation. See, e.g., Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771
F.2d 1020, 1021 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing a humiliating search conducted pursuant to a
Chicago Police Department policy, in which the arrestee was forced to expose her vaginal
and anal areas after being arrested for a traffic violation); Levka v. City of Chicago, 748
F.2d 421, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing similar search under same Chicago policy);
John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1517-18 (D. Minn. 1985) (reporting that local
police department performed strip searches pursuant to written policy regardless of level
of probable cause that arrestee possessed contraband or weapons). For a detailed descrip-
tion of outrageously invasive strip searches performed pursuant to a municipal ordinance
or written policy, see ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
3-22 (1995).
68. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 n.12 (stating that forcing the government to util-
ize less restrictive alternatives could insuperably hamper the state's power to search and
seize). But see Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting
the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1238-
67 (1988) (criticizing the Court for its inconsistency in resolving this issue and proposing
that the alternative of a lesser intrusive search should be involved in the Court's analysis);
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 225 (criticizing the Court's rationale as contradictory
to the "acceptable results" standard expounded in Camara).
69. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. The Court reasoned that the volume of traffic at
these checkpoints inhibited the particularized observance needed to ascertain reasonable
suspicion. Id. Thus, to retain the required deterrent effect, the search would have to be
allowed without reasonable suspicion. Id.; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (effectively elimi-
nating the requirement of probable cause in municipal housing inspections because of the
incompatibility of such a requirement).
70. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-55 (1990) (reaffirming
Martinez-Fuerte and clarifying these new principles).
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In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,71 the Court adhered to
Martinez-Fuerte,72 by further delineating and solidifying the intrvsive-
ness, least-intrusive-means, and effectiveness arguments in Martinez-Fu-
erte.73 Evaluating the intrusiveness of a drunk-driving checkpoint under
Sitz, the natural trepidation and surprise sensed by the law-abiding mo-
torist is to be considered in the Court's analysis, not the fear evoked in a
potential offender.74 Regarding the least-intrusive-means argument, the
means chosen are for the legislature to decide, not the judiciary, thus cre-
ating a presumption of validity for the state's checkpoint.75 Furthermore,
the Court utilized statistics showing the arrest rate at the checkpoint, to
sustain the reasonableness of the stop.76 Thus, the Court solidified the
71. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
72. Id. at 455.
73. Id. at 451-55. But see id. at 464-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing the in-
creased police discretion in a sobriety checkpoint search to the limited police discretion in
a border-related search). "A check for a driver's license, or for identification papers at an
immigration checkpoint, is far more easily standardized than is a search for evidence of
intoxication .... A ruddy complexion, an unbuttoned shirt, bloodshot eyes, or a speech
impediment may suffice to prolong the detention." Id.; Clancy, supra note 28, at 621-22
(arguing that while the Court may maintain that the officials have limited discretion, in
reality, these officers increasingly have more discretion in constitutionally permissible
searches).
74. Id. at 452; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (implying
that the fright discussed only referred to "law-abiding motorists"). Compare Sitz, 496 U.S.
at 452-53 (holding that a sobriety checkpoint should not incite fear or trepidation in a law-
abiding motorist) with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (holding that a ran-
dom vehicle stop to check for valid license and registration information is unconstitutional,
partly because of the substantial anxiety, inconvenience, and interference that a random,
suspicionless stop causes).
75. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54. The Court deduced from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979), that Brown should not be read "to transfer from politically accountable officials to
the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement tech-
niques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453; see
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566 (according deference to higher ranking officials in their
administrative decisionmaking).
76. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55. The Court compared the 1.6% arrest rate at the sobriety
checkpoint to the 0.12% arrest rate at the constitutionally permissible immigration check-
point in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. This reliance on empirical data approaches cost-benefit anal-
ysis. See Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 49
(theorizing that cost-benefit analysis should be utilized to analyze Fourth Amendment is-
sues). For instance, Judge Posner asserts:
A reasonable search is a cost-justified search. The most important cost of a
search is the cost to the lawful interests that the search invades. That cost, a
function of the intrusiveness of the search, must be weighed against the benefits
of the search. The benefits are a function of the probability that the search will
turn up incriminating evidence or leads and of the value to law enforcement of
such evidence or leads; this value in turn is a function of the gravity of the crime
and the importance of the evidence to conviction. Thus, the less intrusive the
search, the higher the probability that it will be fruitful, the more vital the evi-
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least-intiusive means and effectiveness factors as part of the balancing
analysis used to determine reasonableness.77
C. "Special Needs": Searches of Persons and Their Effects
1. Searches Conducted in Public School
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court first applied the reasonableness
standard and balancing test to searches of high school students.78 After
noting that the search of a student's purse violated the student's expecta-
dence obtained, and the graver the crime being investigated, the likelier that the
search is reasonable.
Id. at 74. But see Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469-470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the
Court's use of empirical data is superficial and incomplete: "although the gross number of
arrests is more than zero, there is a complete failure of proof on the question whether the
wholesale seizures have produced any net advance in the public interest in arresting intoxi-
cated drivers"); Strossen, supra note 68, at 1181 (criticizing the Court for indulging in a
"utilitarian cost-benefit balancing calculus"); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1800 (arguing that
the suspicionless intrusion upheld by the Sitz Court "had little noticeable impact on the
societal problem beyond that which conventional reliance on individualized suspicion had
produced, and perhaps had even been counterproductive").
77. See generally Clancy, supra note 28, at 662 (noting that by simply accepting the
government official's decision as evidence of effectiveness and by not exploring less intru-
sive means, the Court has "eliminated any requirement of need as a precondition for suspi-
cionless intrusions") (footnote omitted).
78. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., a high school assistant principal discovered mari-
juana in a concealed compartment of a student's purse, while searching for cigarettes. Id.
at 328. The principal at first found rolling papers in T.L.O.'s purse, and then suspicious of
drugs, searched a small compartment of the purse, finding drugs, a pipe, and a list of stu-
dents owing T.L.O. money. Id.
The Court found the traditional warrant and probable cause requirement to be impracti-
cal and an impediment to school authority, and thus utilized the reasonableness standard.
Id. at 343. The Court deliberated that requiring a warrant would unduly interfere with the
school's need for swift disciplinary procedures. Id. at 340. Moreover, without a warrant
and probable cause requirement, "the standard will spare teachers and school administra-
tors the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit
them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense." Id.
at 343. The peculiarities of the school environment have caused the Court to relax other
constitutional guarantees as well. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) (denying
the students' procedural due process claim, because requiring public schools to implement
extensive procedures would substantially encumber using corporal punishment as an effec-
tive disciplinary measure).
Eliminating the warrant requirement, the Court announced the following balancing test:
"[o]n one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy
and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal
with breaches of public order." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. The T.L.O. Court properly articu-
lated the purpose of the balancing test announced in Camara. Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (reasoning that the balancing test accomodates competing public
and private interests).
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tion of privacy,79 the Court found the student's privacy interest out-
weighed by the school's need for order and security in maintaining the
proper educational environment.8 ° Unlike earlier cases, however, where
the balancing test determined the reasonableness of a search,81 in T.L.O.,
the balancing test determined whether the reasonableness test should
even be applied. 82 Nevertheless, the Court found the search to be rea-
sonable and established the balancing analysis as the appropriate test for
school searches.
83
2. Searches Conducted at the Workplace
In O'Connor v. Ortega,' the Supreme Court, in determining whether a
public employer's search of an employee's office required a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause, concluded that this type of search need only be
reasonable to be constitutional.85 In doing so, the plurality articulated
the "special needs" exception, which serves as a threshold requirement
79. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights at... the schoolhouse gate" in other areas
of constitutional law. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969).
80. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40; see also Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 681 (concluding that,
while distasteful to some, "corporal punishment serves important educational interests");
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (recognizing that teachers in public schools require
discretion in applying disciplinary sanctions because of the frequency of disciplinary
problems that necessitate immediate action).
81. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37 (opining that balancing the need for the search against
the intrusiveness of the search determines the reasonableness of the search).
82. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. The Court in Camara first determined that reasonable-
ness should apply and then utilized the balancing test to answer whether the search was
reasonable. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. By contrast, in T.L.O., the Court stated, "a care-
ful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best
served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
Instead of using the balancing test derived from Camara, the Court used the test laid out in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968), to determine reasonableness, despite the fact that
Terry dealt with a criminal search. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
83. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40, 343.
84. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
85. Id. at 719-22. Suspecting Dr. Ortega of possible office improprieties, Dr.
O'Connor, the Executive Director of the Hospital, directed several employees to conduct
an investigation regarding these charges. Id. at 712-713. Richard Friday, a member of the
investigation team, decided to search Dr. Ortega's office, seizing various personal items
from his desk and file cabinets. Id. at 713. The stated original purpose of the search was
"to secure state property." Id. However, the task of separating state from non-state mate-
rial became too onerous. Id. at 713-14. Therefore, State officials placed Dr. Ortega's be-
longings in a box for storage without inventorying the items. Id. at 714. The items seized
included: "a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry all sent to Dr.
Ortega by a former resident physician. These items were later used in a proceeding ... to
impeach the credibility of the former resident, who testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf." Id. at
713.
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for the Court to dismiss the warrant and probable cause requirement and
proceed with a balancing analysis.86 After O'Connor, finding special
needs became a threshold requirement for employing the reasonableness
standard.87
a. Bodily Intrusive Searches of Public Employees: Blood Tests,
Breath Tests, and Urine Tests
Prior to Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,88 the Court had
used the balancing test and reasonableness standard to uphold the search
of a person's home,89 papers,90 and effects.9 ' The Court extended the
Analyzing these facts, the Court first ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to the
search of Dr. Ortega's desk and office, because the hospital employees conducting the
search constituted government actors. Id. at 715; see Alonso, supra note 53, at 667 (requir-
ing government action for the Fourth Amendment to apply). Next, the Court, as in each
prior case, pointed to some aspect of the government's need which rendered a warrant
"impractical." O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 721; see supra note 33 (discussing the "special needs"
exception announced in O'Connor and noting the use of the "impractical" rationale in
prior cases).
Finally, the Court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to balance the govern-
ment's overriding interest in office efficiency against the employee's expectation of privacy
in his office space. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26. The Court, in instructing the lower court
regarding the various weights assigned to these interests, found the privacy interest less
than robust because of the frequent intrusion of supervisors, employees, and friends enter-
ing an individual's office during a typical business day. Id. at 717. In addition, the Court
found the governmental interest important because the workplace must be operated effi-
ciently to enable the government agency to "provide myriad services to the public.". Id at
723.
86. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720. The Court asserted that " 'exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable.'" Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351
(Blackmun, J., concurring)); see supra note 33 (providing cases that illustrate the special
needs exception).
87. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (providing an introductory assess-
ment of the Court's administrative search jurisprudence).
88. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
89. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (upholding the validity of a proba-
tion officer's search of a probationer's home, performed without probable cause pursuant
to a police detective's unverified tip); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1970) (upholding
a caseworker's home visit to a welfare recipient as a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment).
90. O'Connor 480 U.S, at 725.
91. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328, 340 (1985) (searching a student's purse);
see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that the balancing
test had now been used to cover all explicitly protected areas articulated in the Fourth
Amendment and almost always has resulted in the government's search passing constitu-
tional muster); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abid-
ing Public, 1989 Sup. Cr. REV. 87, 107 (observing that the "Court has upheld nearly all the
administrative searches it has considered since 1980"); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1035 (argu-
ing that the government always prevails in the regulatory setting).
Catholic University Law Review
rationale of closely regulated industries to employees' urinalyses and con-
cluded that the government has a compelling need where a risk of great
loss of human lives exists.92 Skinner upheld federal regulations requiring
that public railroad employees submit to a blood, breath, or urine test
after a "major train accident." 93 After noting that a person's excretory
functions are "traditionally shielded by great privacy,"'94 the Court found
that these employees had a diminished expectation of privacy because
92. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-29. Contra Loree L. French, Note, Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association and the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause Re-
quirement: Special Needs Exception Creating a Shakedown Inspection?, 40 CAT. U. L.
REV. 117, 149 (1990) (criticizing the Skinner majority for employing the rationale of closely
regulated industry cases).
The Court relied on other common factors from prior case law. Skinner at 619-20. The
search in Skinner did not pertain to criminal prosecution. Id. at 619-20. Additionally, the
Court reasoned that the systematic nature of the search regime decreased the official's
discretion and lowered the intrusiveness of the search. Id. at 626-27; see United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (ruling that open and systematic nature of high-
way checkpoint decreased the intrusiveness of the search); Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990) (same). Furthermore, the Court utilized the special needs
exception, announced in O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720, to justify disregarding the lack of a
warrant and probable cause, and proceeding with the reasonableness test. Id. at 619.
93. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. The Court upheld the search after determining that the
government's compelling interest outweighed the individual's privacy interest. Id. at 633.
Under the Federal Railroad Administration's regulations, five occurrences trigger bodily
intrusive tests. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608-12. In the event of any of the five occurrences, the
supervisors must round-up all employees and transport them to a hospital, where these
employees must provide blood and urine samples. Id. at 609-10 (citing 49 C.F.R.
§ 219.201(a)(3) (1987)). In the event of an accident or incident that a supervisor reason-
ably suspects to be precipitated by an employee's negligence, or in the event of a rule
violation, such as speeding, the supervisor may order either a urine or breath test, or both.
Id. at 611.
One commentator described the considerable impact of Skinner, observing that "[i]n the
transportation industry alone, 4 million workers face random testing." Schulhofer, supra
note 91, at 87-88. In addition, Professor Schulhofer argues that various problems inhere in
drug testing, namely, that it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. Id. at 123-27. A test
may be overinclusive because of the risk of erroneous results. Id. at 123-25 (stating that an
Air Force Base laboratory reported a sixty percent error rate and finding that bagels with
poppy seeds may trigger a positive finding of morphine, while Advil may trigger a positive
finding of marijuana). A test may be underinclusive because drugs are not the only causes
of worker error and unproductivity. Id. at 125 (noting that marital problems or lack of
sleep, for example, may impair a worker).
94. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. The Court stated:
"There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing
of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its perform-
ance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom."
Id at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)); see Fried, supra, note 5, at 487 (asserting that
"[tihus in our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy,
so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely
distressing, as detracting from one's dignity and self-esteem").
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they were involved in a close regulated industry.95 The Court ruled that
the government's interest was compelling and refused to require individu-
alized suspicion because of the risk of a train catastrophe and because of
the fact that employee drug use cannot be determined conclusively ab-
sent a test.96 To support its conclusion, the Court relied on empirical data
provided by the railway industry that showed that railroad employees had
a history of drug and alcohol abuse. 97 Thus, suspicionless, yet invasive
searches could be constitutional, so long as the government can justify the
intrusion by showing a compelling need outweighing the privacy interest
at stake.98
In a companion case to Skinner, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab,9 the Court upheld the Customs Service's suspicionless drug
testing program of any employee who sought a promotion requiring them
to carry firearms or participate in the interdiction of drugs.100 The Court
analogized the test to cases involving border and border-related searches,
because Customs agents were the "first line of defense."'' As in Skin-
95. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-28. But see French, supra note 92, at 149 (contending that
Skinner incorrectly applies the rationale of the closely regulated industry cases, because in
those cases the object of the search was the industry, whereas in Skinner the object was the
employee).
96. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-29. While the Skinner Court found the need supporting
the search to be compelling, the Court has required different levels of need in prior case
law. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691. 702-03 (1987) (requiring a substantial
governmental interest); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (requiring a legiti-
mate governmental interest on the government's side of the scale); Clancy, supra note 28,
at 599 (summarizing the different levels of government interest found in this body of case
law).
97. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607 n.1 (relying on a 1979 study that " 'estimated one out of
every eight railroad workers drank at least once while on duty' "). In addition to specific
studies, the Court speculated that the history of "alcohol use on American railroads is as
old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it by carrier rules began at least a century
ago." Id. at 606.
In Skinner, the Court employed history in two ways. First, similar to the closely regu-
lated industry cases, the Court, in deducing that the railroad employees have a diminished
privacy interest, stated that "the covered employees have long been a principal focus of
regulatory concern." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. Second, the Court used history to illustrate
the need for the governmental intrusion. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-29. Thus, in effect, the
Court used history to both increase the weight on the government's side of the scale and
lower the weight on the individual's side of the scale in the balancing analysis. Id.
98. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
99. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
100. Id. at 679. Balancing the government's interest against the individual's, the Court
found the government's more compelling. Id. at 677.
101. It at 668. Thus, it appears that to attain a privilege from the government, in this
case a promotion, the individual must surrender some of her Fourth Amendment right to
privacy. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 221 (contending that this is a possible
rationale in the closely regulated industry line of cases). In explaining the employee's di-
minished expectation of privacy, the Court in Von Raab also stated that "[u]nlike most
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ner, the Court did not require individualized suspicion as a basis for con-
ducting a search because drug use and its effects are difficult to detect. 10 2
However, while Skinner and prior cases utilized empirical data to supple-
ment the governmental need prong of the reasonableness argument, 103
Von Raab relied solely on the government's speculative theory that the
Customs Service is not immune from the pervasive drug problem in
American society.10 4 In fact, because the government's primary objective
private citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in drug interdic-
tion reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity." Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 672. This reasoning relies on the premise that advance notice of the search
diminishes an expectation .of privacy. But see Searle, supra note 58, at 280 (criticizing the
logic of the majority's rationale in Burger, where the Court implied that notice of an ad-
ministrative search diminishes the individual's expectation of privacy).
102. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-70. Von Raab reflects prior case law, in the sense that
individualized suspicion and a warrant requirement are impractical, constituting an ex-
pendable impediment to effective government enforcement. See id. at 665 (discussing
T.L.O., Skinner, and Martinez-Fuerte as evidence that a warrant, probable cause, or indi-
vidualized suspicion may not be required for a search to be reasonable). In fact, the Court
found it inconsequential that innocent people are tested because of the lack of individual-
ized suspicion: "[t]he mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees tested are
entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program's validity." Id. at 674.
Notwithstanding its adherence to this rationale, the Court also introduced a new ration-
ale for not requiring a warrant: its minimal contribution to the protection of the individ-
ual's privacy interest. Id. at 667.
103. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607-08 (1989) (present-
ing statistical evidence of train wrecks and alcohol abuse in the railroad industry); Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990) (presenting statistical evidence
of the effectiveness of a sobriety checkpoint and comparing it to the effectiveness of a
border-related checkpoint to uphold its reasonableness).
104. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674. Under the tremendous breadth of this rationale, ran-
dom drug-testing could be conducted in just about any government workplace. See
Schulhofer, supra note 91, at 87-88 (recognizing the tremendous potential effect that Skin-
ner [and presumably Von Raab] could have on increasing drug-testing in government
employment).
Moreover, according to the government's argument, drugs could have a damaging effect
on the Customs Agency, because employees "may be tempted not only by bribes from the
traffickers ... but also by their own access to vast sources of valuable contraband seized
and controlled by the Service." Id. at 669. Again, the breadth of this argument must be
noted. See Schulhofer supra note 91, at 146-47 (criticizing the majority's reasoning be-
cause it could apply to any government official and the chance for bribery or blackmail
arguably is very low). But see Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989)
(narrowly reading the facts of Von Raab and thus holding that a urinalysis program is
unconstitutional as applied to corrections officers who do not carry firearms or have the
ability to smuggle drugs to inmates).
Recognizing the dangers in relying on purely speculative generalizations to sustain the
reasonableness of the search, Justice Scalia, in the majority in Skinner, dissented in Von
Raab. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He asserted:
I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency
of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the
Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in
symbolic opposition to drug use.
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was to deter agents' drug use, the Court reasoned that empirical data
showing a low incidence of drug use, would thus demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of drug testing.10 5 Therefore, after Von Raab, the effectiveness
of the search, and the need supporting it, became a moot point. 10 6 If the
empirical data illustrated a low rate of success, the search furthered its
objective of deterrence. 10 7 If the empirical data illustrated a higher rate
of success, the search revealed the effectiveness and need for testing in
this area.10 8
D. Synthesizing the Case Law and Creating an Analytical Framework
Taken together, these cases have established an analytical framework.
First, the Court determines whether the Fourth Amendment applies by
The Court's opinion ... will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real
problem that will be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees....
The only pertinent points, it seems to me, are supported by nothing but specula-
tion, and not very plausible speculation at that.
Id. at 681-82. Justice Scalia also noted that, unlike other cases where the government need
is compelling, there existed almost no risk of catastrophic harm in Von Raab. Id. at 684.
Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that justifying a suspicionless, humiliating search with a
broad generalization makes a mockery of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
105. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676 n.3 (contending that "[w]hen the Government's interest
lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a low incidence of such conduct, far from im-
pugning the validity of the scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed
as a hallmark of success"). But see Clancy, supra note 28, at 600-01 (arguing that deter-
rence is a proper governmental focus and in fact closely related to the necessity of the
search, only when the government shows that it can not identify the potential danger in
advance).
106. See Clancy, supra note 28, at 605 (contending that Von Raab eroded any require-
ment to show need). Supporting his argument, Professor Clancy noted that the Court ad-
mitted that the Customs Service did not present any evidence supporting a drug use
problem and failed to show that drug testing would expose substantial employee drug use.
Id.; see also Sundby, supra note 5, at 1800 (arguing that the majority "simply point[ed] to a
general societal problem with drugs and claim[ed] a symbolic need for the testing of Cus-
toms agents although no evidence existed that the targeted group was engaged in drug
use").
107. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676 n.3.
108. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990) (holding
that a 1.6% arrest rate at a sobriety checkpoint was sufficient to demonstrate the effective-
ness of the government's interest in law enforcement); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 563-64 nn.16-17 (1976) (relying on statistics to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the search).
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ascertaining whether government action,109 regardless of its purpose,110
invaded an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.1" Next, under
the special needs test, if requiring a warrant, probable cause, or individu-
alized suspicion would interfere with the government's objectives, be
otherwise impractical," 2 or would minimally protect the individual's pri-
vacy interest,' 13 the Court uses a reasonableness standard to analyze the
search. 4 To determine reasonableness, the Court, of course, balances
the "individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security"
109. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (ruling that
government action occurs where private parties act as agents of the state); see New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (holding that an assistant principal at a public school is a
government actor); Alonso, supra note 53, at 666 (stating that the actor must constitute a
state actor for a Fourth Amendment search to occur).
110. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (recognizing that the
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable intrusions posed by searches
regardless of whether the purpose of the search was criminal or administrative).
111. E.g. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-18; O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Thus, the first
thing the Court must do is determine whether an individual, not his property or effects, has
a reasonable expectation of privacy. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16 (noting that the
court must first decide whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office space); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (observing that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places"). If no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the individual is not
afforded the protections of the Fourth Amendment. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-41 (ruling that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage bag left by the
curb). A reasonable expectation of privacy is one that society accepts as objectively rea-
sonable. Id. at 39-40.
112. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976); see also supra note 33 (discussing the various formula-
tions of the special needs exception and the "impractical" rationale supporting this
exception).
There are various weaknesses to the special needs exception. For example, in O'Connor
the special need consisted of the "efficient and proper operation of the workplace."
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725. If this rather mundane need reaches the level of "special," the
government should rarely have difficulty meeting this exception. Clancy, supra note 28, at
597-99 (arguing that the special need is really a special interest and these special interests
often are very mundane). There are two consequences trivializing the special needs excep-
tion. First, affording mundane governmental interests "special" status could result in the
special needs exception enveloping Fourth Amendment analysis. Clancy, supra note 28, at
598. Second, characterizing ordinary government administrative needs as "special" facili-
tates the government in justifying the search. See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1032 (observing
that, in administrative searches, the government's need is not the need to engage in the
search itself, but really the much broader (and more difficult to overcome) need to main-
tain the established regulatory regime); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1796-97 (arguing that the
special needs exception is skewed in the government's favor, because it fails to consider the
"special costs" that the individual sustains as a result of the government's special need).
113. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
114. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725. The Court must pass the special needs threshold to use
the reasonableness test. Id.; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
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against the "government's need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order. 115
In weighing both sides of the balance, the Court first analyzes the
weight of the individual's expectation of privacy. 116 Next, the Court eval-
uates the government's side of the balance, primarily analyzing the gov-
ernmental need and interest in conducting the search.1 17 The Court then
115. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
116. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-28. The Court may look at the history of the search to
determine the privacy interest of the individual. Id. at 627-28 (holding that railroad em-
ployees, like many closely regulated industries, "have long been a principal focus of regula-
tory concern"); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 705-06 (1987) (imputing a history of
regulation to the vehicle dismantling industry, because its commercial predecessor, the
junkyard, had a history of government regulation). In addition, the Court may examine
whether the individual had notice of the pending search. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 (ruling
that Customs agents, because of the fact that they carry firearms, should expect govern-
ment inquiry to determine their judgment and dexterity). But see Searle, supra note 58, at
267 (criticizing the Court's logic in reasoning that notice of the search diminishes a person's
expectation of privacy).
Furthermore, if the individual voluntarily enters a sphere of regulation, such as when a
business owner enters a closely regulated industry, the individual's expectation of privacy
may be diminished. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (ruling that a junk dealer is involved in a
closely regulated business, and thus, has a diminished expectation of privacy); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (ruling that a businessman should expect inspec-
tions of his business records, when he enters a pervasively regulated industry, such as the
ammunition and gun industry). But see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 221 (arguing
that by diminishing the individual's expectation of privacy the Court is effectively stating
that the individual impliedly consents to these searches by voluntarily entering a known
zone of regulation).
117. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670; Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. Gov-
ernmental need may be a legitimate interest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
It may be a substantial interest. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702. Or, it may be a compelling inter-
est. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670. The most recent Supreme Court opinions appear to favor
a requirement that the government show a compelling government interest. Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 628. In support of these interests, the government may use empirical data. Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990) (citing specific apprehension
rates at a sobriety checkpoint); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607 n.1 (citing a 1979 study that esti-
mated that one out of every eight railroad employees drank alcohol at least once on the
job); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 553 (citing general statistics of the
number of illegal aliens entering the country each year). Or, the government also may
argue that there is a history of problematic conduct. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-29. Alterna-
tively, the government may support its need for the search by relying on pure theory,
shown by the government's articulated objective of deterring conduct that could pose a
substantial threat to the public welfare. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-76.
Either way the government's need must be supplemented by a showing that the search
method used is effective. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 (requiring the government to show pro-
ductiveness of the search to justify the search's intrusion). Von Raab makes this a superfi-
cial factor, however, because the government may show the productiveness of the search
by pointing to successful statistics, thus demonstrating the productivity of the search. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3. In contrast, the government also may rely on statistics exempli-
fying a low rate of success, thereby showing the furtherance of the government objective of
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weighs the two interests to determine which is greater, thereby discerning
the reasonableness of the search.118 Other factors, however, such as the
amount of discretion afforded the official performing the search, 1 9 or the
nature of the search method chosen by the state,12 ° may also serve as
factors in judging the reasonableness of the search.
II. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT V. ACTON. RANDOM DRUG TESTING
OF MIDDLE SCHOOL AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT ATHLETES
In Vernonia School District v. Acton,121 the United States Supreme
Court determined whether a public school district's suspicionless urinal-
ysis drug testing of middle school and high school student athletes vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.' 22 The Supreme Court found that the
immediacy and severity of the school's interest in stopping its drug prob-
lem combined with the minimal intrusiveness of the urinalysis, out-
weighed the athletes' privacy interests. 123 Therefore, the Court held that
the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'
24
deterrence. Id.; see supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (explaining that Von Raab
has eliminated the requirement that the government show that the search method is
effective).
Finally, in examining the government need for the search, the Court has held that the
search method used to support the government's interest need not be the least intrusive
alternative. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976). Furthermore,
the government officials and the search method that they elected will be afforded a pre-
sumption of validity. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55.
118. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
119. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
In eliminating the warrant and probable cause requirements that constrain the discretion
of the government officials, the Court looks for adequate substitutes to similarly restrain
the discretion of the officer. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (requiring that the statute authorizing
the challenged search embody a " 'constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant' ")
(quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)). The Court hypothesizes that less
discretion causes a reduced chance for abuse of discretion, which consequently diminishes
the chance of a severe intrusion occurring. See supra note 67 (clarifying that this rationale
only serves to decrease the potential for a severe intrusion and does not, in reality, dimin-
ish the intrusiveness of the search).
120. Compare Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559 (holding that the regularized and open
manner of the checkpoint supports the holding that the search is reasonable) and Sitz, 496
U.S. at 453 (concluding that the open and non-random nature of a sobriety checkpoint, in
part, rendered the search method employed reasonable) with Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656-57
(observing that the random stop at issue provided no notice to the motorist, and thus con-
stituted an unreasonable search). The more open and systematic a search is, the less dis-
cretion an officer has in the search. See supra note 92 (explaining that, in Skinner and
other prior cases, minimal discretion supports the Court's holding that the search is
reasonable).
121. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
122. Id. at 2388.




In 1988, in response to an increase in disciplinary problems believed to
be drug-related, the Vernonia School District, with strong parental sup-
port,12 5 adopted a random drug testing policy applicable only to student
athletes. 12 6 The school targeted only student athletes because the admin-
istration perceived athletes to be heavily involved in the escalating drug
activity.' 2 7 The school also rationalized that, as role models for other stu-
dents, athletes should be tested.1 8
Therefore, the district enacted a detailed testing procedure.'2 9 If a stu-
dent tested positive, the school arranged a hearing with the student and
125. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (observing that the large majority of parents unquestiona-
bly supported the drug testing program). Specifically, the school conducted a "parent 'in-
put night,'" where the parents approved exclusively drug testing student athletes. Id. at
2389.
126. Id. Student athletes compose approximately seventy-five percent of the school
population. Stephen Chapman, Vernonia Another Battleground in Drug War, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Mar. 31, 1995, at B7.
This policy was adopted only after other reform actions, such as educational programs,
produced unsatisfactory results. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. At one point, the school re-
sorted to using drug-sniffing dogs, "but the drug problem persisted." Id.
127. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388-89. The school authorities cited the following incidents
as proof that a drug problem existed and that student athletes were involved with this
problem:
Athletic coaches noticed an increase in the number and severity of injuries, which
they attributed to greater drug use. . . . They personally saw some of the
problems, but were told of others.... Among other things, one teacher had often
seen students smoking marijuana during the school day at a coffee shop across the
street from the high school. An English teacher received several essays describ-
ing and glorying in scenes of student drug and alcohol use. At one wrestling meet
a boy was seriously injured when he failed to perform a basic well-drilled safety
maneuver.
Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386
(1995).
128. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d
1514 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). Justice Scalia assumed that in a small
town such as Vernonia "athletes are admired in their schools and in the community." Ac-
ton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
129. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389-90. School officials picked athletes randomly each week
from a pool of athletes for drug testing. Id. at 2389. Prior to each season, athletes had to
sign a consent form for drug testing. Id. If they refused to sign, they were not allowed to
participate. Id. at 2390. Students chosen to be tested entered an empty locker room with a
school official of the same sex. Id. at 2389. The male athletes would produce a urine
sample, while fully dressed and with their back to the school monitor. Id. Female athletes
entered an enclosed bathroom stall and would produce the sample, while the female moni-
tor stood outside of the stall and listened for any indications of tampering. Id. In either
case, the monitor then checked the temperature of the sample and for other signs of tam-
pering, sealed the vial, and witnessed the student sign it. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
After being assigned a control number, the student completed a control form, attesting
that the specimen contained his or her urine and that the official properly sealed the sam-
ple in his or her presence. Id. The school then sent the sample to a lab to be tested for
marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, and alcohol. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. At the district's
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his parents. 3 ° At this point, the student could either submit to weekly
testing for six weeks, or sit out the remainder of the current and subse-
quent athletic seasons.13 1
The Vernonia middle school did not permit James Acton, a seventh-
grader, to participate on the football team because he declined to submit
to the drug testing program. 132 His parents refused to sign the drug test-
ing consent form, and after meeting with school officials, brought an ac-
tion for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District
Court of Oregon. 133 The District Court held that the random drug testing
program passed constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore denied the Actons' claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief.134
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, without dissent, reversed
the District Court, holding that the school's policy violated the Fourth
Amendment. 35 The Court of Appeals used a four-part test to evaluate
the reasonableness of the search. 136 First, analyzing the efficiency of the
search, the court ruled that this factor marginally supported the drug test-
ing policy.137 Second, in evaluating the discretion of the school officials,
the court found that the random and systematic nature of the search elim-
request, the laboratory could screen the samples for other drugs, such as LSD. Id. Per-
forming the tests, lab technicians relied on the control number of the specimen, without
knowing the identity of the person being tested. Id.
These tests usually are very expensive for school districts. See Amy Piniak, Drug Testing
Kids is More than a Drop in the Bucket, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 30, 1995, at 6D
(estimating that one high school paid about $50 for each drug test and advocating that this
money could be spent on more pressing educational purposes); Anna Varela & Nancy
McLaughlin, Drug Tests of Student Athletes Debated, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, July
6, 1995, at B1, B2 (estimating at best each test would cost about $18 per student, and
therefore to test all of the student athletes in one county's school system would cost ap-
proximately $148,000).
130. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390. If the first test result is positive, a student performs a
second urinalysis as soon as possible. Id. If that test is negative, the school pursues no
further action. Id.
131. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359. In order to participate again, the athlete must be
retested before the next season for which they are eligible. Id.
132. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390. To participate in any sport, the athlete first had to sign a
consent form. Id.
133. Id.
134. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1365.
135. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2386 (1995).
136. Id. at 1521. The Court gleaned this four-part test from Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653-663 (1979).
137. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1522. The efficiency of the search was only slightly in favor of
the constitutionality of the search "because the exact nature of the goal [was] not entirely
clear." Id. But see Robert J. Farley, Jr., Recent Decision, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 439, 456
(1995) (noting that if the court could not define the school's goals, it "could not determine
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inated the chance of purely discretionary searches.138 Third, the court
compared the school's interest in testing to other cases and did not find
the interest compelling.' 39 Fourth, the court examined the physical and
psychological intrusiveness of the search.' 40 Characterizing the athletes'
privacy interest as "robust," the court reasoned that athletes should be
treated no differently than adults. 4 ' After weighing all these factors, the
Court concluded that Vernonia's drug testing policy violated the Fourth
Amendment.
142
The United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of
Appeals, upholding the random, suspicionless drug testing policy of the
school district under the Fourth Amendment. 143 The Court found that
student athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy and noted the
minimal intrusiveness of the search.'" More importantly, in assessing the
if the Policy was necessary in attaining those goals"). In addition, the school could have
pursued other "practical, less intrusive alternatives to urinalysis." Id. at 454.
138. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1522; see supra notes 67, 119 (explaining how the discretion of
the official conducting the search impacts the courts' decisionmaking).
139. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1526. The court reasoned that the drug danger the high school
and middle school athletes presented did not contain the same degree of danger found to
be compelling in Skinner. Id. Compare Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (concluding that the danger of a train wreck and the threat of great
human loss creates a compelling state interest); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
1245 v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that the danger of a nuclear catastrophe is compelling) and National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the govern-
ment's need in testing aviation employees is compelling because of the possibility that a
single mistake might cause an aviation calamity), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) with
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395 (1995) (holding that the threat of drug
use by student athletes at the high school and middle school level is a compelling govern-
ment interest).
However, the lower courts have ruled that a school district does not show a compelling
need by merely speculating that student athletes other students involved in extracurricular
activities were more likely to use drugs than other students. See Brooks v. East Chambers
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
140. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525.
141. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the school district's contention that the locker
room activities involved in athletics diminishes the athlete's expectation of privacy. Id.
The Court declared, "[n]ormal locker room or restroom activities are a far cry from having
an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the results of one's urination." Id. Further-
more, the Court asserted that voluntary participation in athletics was "insufficient to re-
duce [athletes'] privacy interests to a minimum level." Id.
142. Id. at 1526.
143. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
144. Id. at 2394. Justice Scalia held that the "invasion of privacy was not significant."
Id. But see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the nature of a urinalysis is "particularly destructive of
privacy and offensive to personal dignity").
There are striking similarities between the urinalysis procedure at issue in Von Raab and
the one at issue in Vernonia. Compare id. with Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. In Von Raab,
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government's interest in the search, the Court found that the compelling
need for the policy cannot be assessed in terms of a fixed, minimum quan-
tum. 145 Therefore, the Court created a new flexible definition of what
constitutes "compelling."' 46
A. The Majority: Further Eroding the Fourth Amendment by
Expanding the Definition of a Compelling Need
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first stated that the Fourth
Amendment applied to Vernonia's drug testing policy. 47 Relying on
prior cases, the Court ruled that a state-compelled urinalysis 148 conducted
by a public school official is a search under the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. 49 Next, Justice Scalia reasoned that the language of the
Fourth Amendment does not expressly require a warrant.150 He noted
that a warrant or probable cause may not be needed for a search to be
reasonable when special needs, such as the quick disciplinary needs of a
school, rendered these requirements "impracticable."'' Moreover, the
Justice Scalia described the urinalysis procedure: " 'a monitor of the same sex ... remains
close at hand to listen for the normal sounds,' and . . . the excretion thus produced [is]
turned over to the Government for chemical analysis." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (quoting
Id. at 661) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion)). The discrepancy in Justice Scalia's opinions
may be the fact that adolescents were the object of Vernonia's search. See Lisa Daniels,
Vernonia's Day in Court, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 29, 1995, at Al (quoting Justice
Scalia: "Students are kids. You're dealing with children. You're not dealing with adults.").
145. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
146. Id. at 2394-95. Justice Scalia defined a compelling interest as one "which appears
important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors which
show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." Id. De-
ciphering this definition, one can see that, to amount to compelling, the need for the search
only has to overcome the privacy interests of the individual.
147. Id. at 2390; see supra note 109-11 (explaining the Court's methodology in deter-
mining that a search has occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
148. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (ruling that a state-compelled urinalysis is a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
149. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390; see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985)
(concluding that public school officials are government actors)
150. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91. Consequently, this type of administrative search did
not require a warrant; hence, Justice Scalia argued that probable cause was not required
either. Id. Justice Scalia rationalized, "a warrant is not required to establish the reasona-
bleness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not required (and the Warrant
Clause therefore not applicable), probable cause is not invariably required either." Id.
151. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
In addition, because the search was conducted in the context of a public school, the major-
ity could rely on T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41. In T.L.O., the Court did not require probable
cause because it interfered with "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom ... to maintain order in the schools." Id. at 341; see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 681 (1977) (concluding that educational disciplinary procedures serve a state interest);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (opining that teachers require discretion in ad-
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majority ruled that individualized suspicion, a diluted form of probable
cause, was not required necessarily.15 Therefore, the Court passed the
special needs threshold, and proceeded to use the reasonableness stan-
dard to analyze the constitutional validity of the search.153
As in prior cases, to ascertain the reasonableness of the school district's
policy, the Court balanced the individual's interest in privacy against the
government's interest in preventing drug use.154 After evaluating the pri-
vacy interests involved in this search, the Court found the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy to be minimal. 5 5 From a general
standpoint, the majority noted that the breadth of a person's privacy in-
terest may depend upon his or her legal relationship to the state.1 56 In
ministering their disciplinary actions because of the frequency of events in a public school
that necessitate immediate action); see also supra note 33 (discussing the various formula-
tions of the special needs exception).
152. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. In fact, "[d]istrict officials have said they did not suspect
James [Acton] of drug use." Daniels, supra note 144, at Al; see United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (stating that the "Fourth Amendment imposes no irreduci-
ble requirement of such suspicion").
153. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91. Construing the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia
concluded that reasonableness is the ultimate measure of a search's constitutional validity.
Id. at 2390; see supra note 46 (presenting the views of Justice Scalia and Professors Taylor
and Amar, who argue that reasonableness is the lodestar of the Fourth Amendment).
154. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (opin-
ing that the reasonableness standard amounts to a balancing of legitimate governmental
interests and individual privacy interests).
155. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-93. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40
(1988) (holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their garbage
after it has been left by the curb) and New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1986)
(finding that an individual has a minimal expectation of privacy in her automobile identifi-
cation number located on the dashboard of her car) with Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93
(finding that student athletes have a minimal expectation of privacy while urinating in the
presence of a state official).
156. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. Referring to the relationship of the state and the stu-
dent, the majority emphasized that "the nature of that power is custodial and tutelary,
permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
adults." Id. at 2392. In this way, the student is analogous to the probationer. Compare
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) (finding that the State and the probationer
have an "ongoing supervisory relationship") with Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (noting the
supervisory relationship between the state and the student). In other areas of constitu-
tional law, such as procedural due process, the Court has been reluctant to scrutinize se-
verely the school's decisionmaking. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977)
(ruling that compelling a school to adopt more procedural safeguards concerning corporal
punishment would unnecessarily intrude upon the school's educational responsibility and
ability to discipline students). But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (declaring that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students").
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addition, the Court reasoned that historically the common law did not
afford minors full fundamental rights. 157
More specifically, Justice Scalia analyzed the peculiar nature of high
school athletics to support his finding that privacy interests of student
athletes are minimal.'58 First, Justice Scalia noted that athletes undress
and usually shower in the presence of one another.' 59 Second, student
athletes "voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation" by par-
ticipating in extracurricular activities. 60 For example, student athletes
must sign insurance waivers, submit to a preseason physical examination,
and maintain the proper grade and behavioral standing with the school to
participate in athletics.' 6 ' Therefore, the Court reasoned that, as in the
closely regulated industry line of cases, the student athlete impliedly con-
sents to governmental intrusions by subjecting himself to regulation. 6 z
Next, the majority found the intrusiveness of the search to be mini-
mal.163 Adhering to Skinner, the Court found that excretory functions
157. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. In the narrow sense of liberty, unemancipated minors
lack "the right to come and go at will." Id. Nevertheless, in the past, the Court has em-
braced students' rights because of the importance of maintaining an open-minded, educa-
tional environment. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
Justice Jackson stated, "educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protec-
tion of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." Id.; see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (1969) (noting that, whether within the con-
fines of school or outside of them, students are "persons" for purposes of the Constitution,
and therefore possess recognized fundamental rights).
158. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93.
159. Id. In the Vernonia locker rooms, there were no private changing rooms or indi-
vidual showers. Id.; cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (holding that a prison
detainee has a diminished expectation of privacy because of the nature of confinement).
160. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393; cf supra note 60 (explaining the Court's rationale that
when individuals voluntarily enter a zone of regulation they diminish their expectation of
privacy).
161. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. Acton's preseason physical examination included pro-
viding a urine sample. See id. The majority added that public schoolchildren, particularly
athletes, have a diminished expectation of privacy because they frequently have to undergo
vaccinations and physical exams. Id. at 2392-93 n.2.
162. Id. at 2393; see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 221 (criticizing the Court for
using this logic in the closely regulated industry cases).
163. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. Compare National Tteasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state-monitored
urinalysis destroyed personal privacy and offended personal dignity), Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 295 (1972) (quoting Terry) (ruling that taking a sample of scrapings from the
defendant's fingernails was a severe "intrusion upon cherished personal security"), and
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (finding that a brief patdown "of the outer surfaces
of a person's clothing" constituted a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person")
with Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (finding that a state-monitored urinalysis minimally intruded
upon an athlete's privacy).
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usually are furnished heightened privacy protection. 164 Yet, the Court
also enumerated various aspects of the drug test, that minimized its intru-
siveness. 165 First, the male athlete, while fully dressed, urinates with his
back to the school monitor. 166 Second, the testing is standardized, con-
ducted in a completely random fashion, and the laboratory tests solely for
illegal drugs.167 Third, the laboratory released the results of the test only
to parents of the athlete and to a "limited class of school personnel," not
law enforcement officials.'16 Lastly, the majority rejected the Actons' ar-
gument that these tests were intrusive because they required the athlete
to divulge any medications he or she was taking to ensure the test's accu-
racy. 169 Therefore, the Court concluded that the search insignificantly in-
truded upon the athlete's diminished expectation of privacy because of
the standardized, and privacy-protecting aspects of the policy. 7 °
The majority next weighed the government's interest, which consisted
of the government's need for the search, and the efficacy of the search
method employed, against the individual's privacy interest. 17 1 Noting
that the district court required the school to show a compelling need for
the search, Justice Scalia took the opportunity to redefine compelling. 172
Propounding that compelling may not be reduced to a quantum, Justice
Scalia reasoned that compelling "describes an interest which appears im-
portant enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other
factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy."'1 73 Under this new test, the Court found the
164. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393; see supra note 94 (discussing the privacy value our soci-
ety affords the excretory function).
165. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
166. Id.; see supra note 129 (explaining the testing procedure and the different proce-
dures for male and female athletes).
167. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393; see supra note 67 (explaining how courts favor the sys-
tematic nature of the search and the resulting decreased discretion of the state officials to
demonstrate the minimal intrusiveness of the search).
168. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. Adhering to prior case law, the Court weighed the non-
criminal purpose of the search. Id. Justice Scalia argued that "the search here is under-
taken for prophylactic and distinctly nonpunitive purposes." Id. at 2393 n.2; see supra note
38 (discussing how the purpose of the search affects the Court's decisionmaking).
169. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393-94. The school's policy required the student to identify
any prescription medications he or she was taking. Id. at 2394. Furthermore, the school
required that the student provide verification that he or she was actually taking the medi-
cations. Id. Faced with this, the majority speculated that the school might have allowed
James Acton to send the requested information to the laboratory in a confidential manner.
Id. As Justice Scalia notes, there is no language in the policy supporting this speculation,
but the Court, in his words, "will not assume the worst." Id
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2394-95.
173. See id.; supra note 146 (deciphering Justice Scalia's definition of compelling).
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school's need, to deter the student body from drug use, compelling, be-
cause of the harmful effects drugs have on adolescents and the increased
risk of drug-induced injuries to athletes. 174
The Court did not accept the Actons' proposed, less-intrusive alterna-
tive-drug testing students individually suspected of drug use.175 The
Court reasoned that basing drug testing on suspicion would create a
"badge of shame" for the students the school officials chose to test and
would divert teachers from their primary role of educating students. 76
Furthermore, the Court found exclusive testing of athletes was rational
because the school's evidence supported the theory that athletes were
connected strongly to the school's drug problem. 177 Thus, the majority
found the suspicionless search method to be efficacious and the search
itself to be based on a compelling need.178 Weighing these two govern-
ment interest factors against the individual's diminished privacy interests
the Court held that the search was reasonable and hence constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. 79
174. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95 (stating that the concern is compelling in part because
"[s]chool years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs
are most severe"); cf Maclin, supra note 1, at 28, 33-34 (arguing that the Court has bowed
to public pressure, finding the government need compelling because of the hysteria sur-
rounding the "War On Drugs"); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1797 (arguing that the govern-
ment's need is always important, because of the magnitude of social problems facing the
government). But see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
680-84 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (sharply criticizing the majority for merely speculating
that the Customs Service has a drug abuse problem simply because American society has a
drug abuse problem); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979) (finding mere spec-
ulation to be too weak to support the government's need and effectiveness of search, and
thus finding the search unreasonable); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
730 F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that a school district does not show a
compelling need by merely speculating that students participating in extracurricular activi-
ties were more likely to use drugs than other students).
175. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. The Court argued from prior cases that the reasonable-
ness test of the Fourth Amendment does not demand individualized suspicion and the least
intrusive means. Id.; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (ruling
that less-intrusive means and individualized suspicion would unduly hamper the state's in-
terest in law enforcement).
176. Acton. 115 S. Ct. at 2396. As in Skinner, the Court found school officials incapable
of detecting drug use, because of the hidden effects of drug use and thus found it impracti-
cal to incorporate individualized suspicion into the test. Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 96 (discussing the underlying rationale of Skinner).
177. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
178. Id. at 2395-96.
179. Id. at 2396. The majority supplemented its decision by noting that the policy had
the substantial support of the parents of students in the community. Id. at 2397. The
Court stated, "[tihe record shows no objection to this districtwide program by any parents
other than the couple before us here." Id.
However, the majority fails to respect the countermajoritarian role of the Court in our
constitutional system. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
1074
1996] Student Privacy Rights 1075
B. The Dissent: What Happened to Individualized Suspicion?
In dissent, Justice O'Connor focused on three weaknesses in the major-
ity's rationale.18 First, the dissent relied on the history of the Fourth
Amendment to contend that broad, blanket-type searches executed by
England in the colonies served as the impetus for enacting the Fourth
Amendment.1 ' The dissent argued that the majority erroneously had
upheld the search by basing part of its decision on the fact that the school
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that the
Court's position in our constitutional system is countermajoritarian); Jesse H. Choper, The
Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 810, 811 (1974) (noting that, when the Court declares a legislative or executive act
unconstitutional, it rejects policies contrived by the majority's elected representatives,
whose decisions represent a manifestation of the popular will). But see Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279, 286 (1957) (asserting that, in deciding policy, the Court is less likely to over-
come a determined lawmaking majority, and conversely, more likely to overcome a weakly
united political coalition).
For example, in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), the
Supreme Court recognized and articulated one aspect of its countermajoritarian role. Id.
The Court declared that it would protect "discrete and insular minorities" who, because of
their minority status in a political system based on majoritarian principles, are too weak
politically to assert the rights afforded to them under the Constitution. Id. While the
Court has never recognized the Nation's youth as constituting an insular and discrete mi-
nority, they are, nevertheless politically powerless. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (be-
stowing the right to vote upon individuals who are eighteen years of age and older, thereby
denying those under the age of eighteen the right to vote).
Moreover, from a general standpoint, the Court, as the protector of individual rights,
should recognize the danger of simply adjudicating by following the popular will. See
Maclin, supra note 20, at A32 (contending that relying on the parents' approval of the drug
testing policy never "should be part of [the Court's] constitutional analysis").
180. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter joined Justice O'Connor in dissent. Id. at 2397.
181. Id. at 2397-2402. Justice O'Connor states "what the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment most strongly opposed ... were general searches-that is, searches by general
warrant, by writ of assistance, by broad statute, or by any other similar authority." Id. at
2398; see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (noting that "[hiostility to
seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment"); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 818 (K.B. 1765) (holding that the
defendants could not use a general warrant to justify their four-hour ransacking of the
plaintiff's house); Clancy, supra note 28, at 489-90 (observing that history supports the
idea that suspicionless searches and seizures compelled the Framers to enact the Fourth
Amendment); Maclin, supra note 1, at 11-12. Professor Maclin argues that the Framers
created the Fourth Amendment in response to England and Colonial America's disrespect
for individual privacy. Id. at 11. He further contends that colonial Americans' resistance
to general search warrants, known as writs of assistance, may have provoked the American
Revolution. Id. at 14. Professor Maclin also hypothesizes that if the colonists denounced
the use of writs of assistance, which served as a pretext to commit severe intrusions, the
colonists undoubtedly would have "opposed warrantless searches by customs officers that
exhibited the same characteristics that marked writs of assistance." Id. at 16-17.
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evenhandedly tested athletes.'82 In other words, the school district's sus-
picionless search policy represented exactly the type of search the Fram-
ers desired to eliminate. 183
Second, the dissent asserted that the history of the Fourth Amendment
and the subsequent case law demonstrate that the Framers required some
level of suspicion, evidenced by the express reference to probable cause,
for a search to be reasonable. 84 While the dissent noted that some cases
have held that individualized suspicion is not always necessary for a
search to be reasonable, these searches either involved a threat of great
182. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2398-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that
privacy, not evenhandedness is the focus of the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV (failing to mention evenhandedness, yet expressly bestowing upon the people
the right "to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures").
183. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2398-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); supra notes 3-5 and
accompanying text (observing that, during colonial times, just as now, warrantless, suspi-
cionless, administrative searches flourished).
184. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend.
IV (expressly stating probable cause); The Collection Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 43
(requiring reasonable suspicion for a duty collector to search merchants goods); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 638 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the Court almost always requires a showing of suspicion by the government to
justify the search); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) ("adher[ing] to the textual
and traditional standard of probable cause"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)
(holding that the government must demonstrate some "articulable and reasonable suspi-
cion" in order for a random search to be constitutional); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216 (hold-
ing that a seizure without probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment); Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (requiring the government to base a search or seizure on
particularized probable cause); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)
(noting that "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a con-
stitutional search or seizure"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (ruling that there
must be articulable facts supporting the government's intrusion); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964) (stating that the validity of an arrest depends on the officers demonstrating
probable cause); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (requiring probable
cause to effect an arrest and cautioning against departing from the probable cause stan-
dard); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (noting that "probable cause has
roots that are deep in our history"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)
(opining that probable cause constitutes more than minimal suspicion); Clancy, supra note
28, at 489 (arguing "[w]hile the plain language of the Amendment does not mandate indi-
vidualized suspicion as a necessary component of all searches and seizures, the historical
record demonstrates that the framers believed that individualized suspicion was an inher-
ent quality of reasonable searches and seizures").
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harm to a large number of persons185 or involved a negligible intrusion on
the person's privacy. 18 6 Acton presented neither of these situations.187
In prior cases, impracticability supported disregarding suspicion. 88
Whereas in Acton, the school offered no evidence that searching students
suspected of drug use would be impracticable. 89 In fact to support the
need for the search, the school district ironically presented evidence of
identifiable students acting in manners that led the school to believe that
these students were using drugs.' 90 The dissent further noted that in
185. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631
(finding particularized suspicion impractical because of threat of massive train wreck);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (involving threat of urban decay and
housing structural weaknesses that not only pose threat of nuisance, but also endanger
surrounding neighborhood).
186. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1990) (search consisting of a thirty-second checkpoint
stop, in which police observed individuals in their automobiles, did not amount to uncon-
stitutional intrusion); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 (upholding brief, suspicionless de-
tention of individual while in automobile, in part because the challenged search minimally
intruded upon the individual's privacy). These cases involved very brief encounters, in
which the State summarily scanned the driver's automobile, whereas in Vernonia, the state
official monitored a high school student while urinating. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
187. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2400-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. See supra note 33 (discussing the special needs exception and how it relies on the
impracticability rationale to eliminate the requirement of suspicion in executing searches).
189. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402-03. The school district has an extensive school code
which enumerates "problem areas." Id. at 2402. In fact, teachers and administrators are
required to enforce this code, possibly handing out sanctions. Id. Therefore, the dissent
reasoned that it would not be impractical for the school to include drug use in this discipli-
nary list, in that the code already charges teachers with the responsibility of investigating a
multitude of offenses, such as possession of tobacco, gambling, vandalism, disorderly con-
duct, fighting, etc. Id.
190. Id. at 2403. The dissent stated that: "[t]he great irony of this case is that most ...
of the evidence the District introduced to justify its suspicionless drug-testing program con-
sisted of first- or second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting in ways that
plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug use .... " Id. At the oral argu-
ment before the Supreme Court the school district relied on individualized suspicion:
MR. VOLPERT [representing the school district]: The district court found...
a startling and progressive increase in the use and glamorization of drugs ....
Teachers testified about a tremendous difference in the type of behavior than
they had seen over the course of the last 16 or 17 years.
QUESTION: None of that sounds like it's confined to athletes.
MR. VOLPERT: Justice Stevens, the district court found that the athletes were
among the leaders of the group ... causing the disruptions. ...
QUESTION: How do they know that if they don't have individualized
suspicion?
... They know who the leaders are who are the most frequent users of drugs,
but they don't have any individualized suspicion as to particular individuals.
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prior cases involving schools, the Court has allowed a search based on at
least some form of suspicion, 191
Third, the dissent attacked the majority for passively accepting the at-
tenuated and circuitous logic found in the district's justification of its sus-
picionless drug testing program.'92 The dissent found that the school
district presented no evidence, and did not even speculate, that an alleged
drug problem existed in the seventh or eighth grade.' 9 3 In addition, the
MR. VOLPERT: Well .... the Ninth Circuit said that ... the district officials
observed conduct which was so far out of the norm that drug use was a logical
conclusion. Now-
QUESTION: Well, that would be individualized suspicion, wouldn't it?
MR. VOLPERT: Well, I don't think so necessarily. If you see in the classroom
someone misbehaving, and you're a teacher, you at that point have to make an
important choice if you're suggesting that you drug test based on individualized
suspicion. You have to decide ... that you're going to make an accusation and
drag someone down to the principal's office.
QUESTION: But Mr. Volpert, isn't that pretty much what the Fourth Amend-
ment is designed to require, something based on individualized suspicion, and the
school district didn't even try that, did they?
MR VOLPERT: ... There was no drug testing program based on reasonable
suspicion.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, No. 94-590, 1995 WL 353412, at *12-15 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1995)
(Transcript of Oral Argument). In addition, the school district justified drug testing middle
school athletes, such as James Acton, by speculating that the drug problem that was pres-
ently afflicting the high school started at a lower grade level and ascended to the high
school as the students did. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406.
191. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 346 (1985) (upholding the search of a student's purse, only after school officials
suspected that student of smoking in school); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
677-78 (1977) (finding that teachers rarely inflict corporal punishment on students without
suspicion and actual evidence of wrongdoing).
192. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted
that even if Vernonia's suspicionless drug testing plan passed constitutional muster, the
school's failure to present adequate evidence to support testing athletes would have proved
constitutionally fatal to the policy. Id. at 2406.
193. Id. at 2406. Justice O'Connor concluded:
The only evidence of a grade school drug problem that my review of the record
uncovered is a "guarantee" by the late-arriving grade school principal that "our
problems we've had ... didn't start at the high school level. They started in the
elementary school." But I would hope that a single assertion of this sort would
not serve as an adequate basis on which to uphold mass, suspicionless drug testing
of two entire grades of student-athletes-in Vernonia and, by the Court's reason-
ing, in other school districts as well.
Id. (citations omitted). Of course, this decision has ramifications for public students
throughout the United States. Justice O'Connor noted that, pursuant to this case, the por-
tion of the eighteen million public school students in grades seven through twelve in the
United States who participate in athletics, or extracurricular activities for that matter, are
subject to random, suspicionless drug testing. Id. at 2397. Shortly after this decision many
public schools began to consider random drug testing their students. See, e.g., Michael
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dissent contended that the school failed to show evidence tying athletes
to the reported increase in classroom disruption. 94 Therefore, the dis-
sent concluded it was both illogical and unreasonable to test student ath-
letes because of an identifiable discipline problem with which they were
not specifically associated. 195
In conclusion, the dissent found the majority's endorsement of the
mass, suspicionless search in a school setting to be unsupported in the
case law, unconstitutional, and simply illogical.196 Justice O'Connor, re-
ferring to the hysteria surrounding the drug problem in this country,
closed her dissent by warning: "[i]t cannot be too often stated that the
greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis.' '
97
Briggs, Drug Testing OKd for Student Athletes: High Court Endorses Public School's Rule,
CHICAGo SUN-TIMES, June 27, 1995, at 14 (citing a local school spokeswoman who stated
that a her school's drug testing policies "could be revisited as a result of this decision");
Piniak, supra note 129, at 6D (reporting that the Hillsborough school district was consider-
ing drug testing all students involved in extracurricular activities); Varela & McLaughlin,
supra note 129, at B1 (citing an attorney at a local school who concluded that drug testing
may be applied to students who take vocational education classes because of the risk in-
volved with using dangerous equipment). But see Ed Bond, On the Issue: Student Rights
vs. Drug Tests for Athletes, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1995, at B3 (Valley ed.) (noting that mem-
bers of the Los Angeles Board of Education disfavor random drug testing).
194. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 190 (demon-
strating the difficulty that the school district had at oral argument to point specifically to
problematic athletes).
195. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The school presented weak
evidence to support its objective of preventing drug-related athletic injuries. Id. For ex-
ample, the only evidence presented by the school in this regard was that of a wrestling
coach who suspected that drug use caused a wrestler's misexecution and resulting injury.
Id. at 2389.
Sports-related injuries, especially at the high school level, occur frequently, regardless of
drug use. See Larry G. McLain, M.D. & Scott Reynolds, Sports Injuries in a High School,
84 PEDIATRICS 446, 446-50, (1989) (reporting that, out of the 1,283 student athletes in a
suburban high school, 280 (22%) suffered injuries, with football having the largest injury
rate and wrestling having the third highest injury rate). Of course, besides unfortuitous
luck, there are other factors such as physical maturity which lead to sports injuries. Rich-
ard E. Kreipe, M.D. & Harry L. Gewanter, M.D., Physical Maturity Screening for Partici-
pation in Sports, 75 PEDIATRICS 1076, 1076-80 (1985) (advising that prospective youth
athletes should be given maturity tests to determine whether they can participate in contact
sports).
196. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. Id. Dissenting in an earlier case, Justice Marshall stated: "[h]istory teaches that
grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Noting the lasting effect of revoking civil liberties, Justice
Marshall wisely cautioned that: "when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in
the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it." Id. In a less
famed portion of his eminent dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis stated:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
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III. TREATING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT FOUND IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. The Weaknesses of the Present Balancing Test
Like a paper clip that was continuously bent and manipulated, the bal-
ancing test was predestined to break. Since its inception in Camara, the
balancing test constantly has been extended, from one type of search to
the next.198 While this may illustrate the versatility of the balancing anal-
ysis, it also demonstrates that the balancing analysis is inherently manipu-
latable, and thus, somewhat illusory.199 Furthermore, this analysis has
been extended artificially to divergent types of searches and consequently
has generated confusing jurisprudence.20 ° Therefore, because susceptibil-
ity to manipulation is the primary weakness of the current balancing test,
a more rigid balancing analysis is needed.2"1 This test must be sufficiently
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
198. See Knopp, supra note 53, at 692 (summarizing the different types of constitution-
ally valid, warrantless searches); supra notes 45-108 and accompanying text (describing and
explaining the types of administrative searches that have used the balancing test and rea-
sonableness standard to evaluate the constitutionality of searches and seizures).
199. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the majority for using the balancing test in an open-ended manner); LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 218 (contending that the balancing test permits the Court greater
freedom from the rigid analytical framework contained in the express language of the
Fourth Amendment). Professors LaFave and Israel consequently criticize the Camara
Court for carelessly and imprecisely using the balancing test. Id.; see also Stuntz, supra
note 11, at 1033-34 (arguing that the transparency of the balancing test results in open-
ended reasonableness review of government regulation); Sundby, supra note 5, at 1772
(referring to the standards used within the balancing analysis as malleable).
200. Compare Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (justi-
fying the search because the liquor sale industry, the object of the search, had a long his-
tory of government regulation) with Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 (justifying the search because
the employee, the object of the search, had a history of heavy regulation). Cf. Schulhofer,
supra note 91, at 107-08 (briefly summarizing the inconsistency of the Court's decisions
and how Justices Scalia, Stevens, O'Connor, and Blackmun repeatedly have opined incon-
sistently in administrative search cases); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1057-58 (contending that
the reasonableness standard embodies a perverse double standard-protecting privacy
when society's interest outweighs it and forsaking the individual's privacy interest when
society's interest is insignificant); supra note 117 (listing the different government interests,
legitimate, substantial, and compelling, that are used in the balancing analysis).
201. See Strossen, supra note 68, at 1187-88 (arguing that the current balancing analysis
is too subjective, allowing value judgments of the judges to affect the outcome of the deci-
sion). Professor Strossen argues "constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties, should
receive the more certain protection resulting from categorical rules rather than the less
certain protection resulting from ad hoc balancing." Id. at 1176. But see Geoffrey G.
Hemphill, Comment, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly What the
Framers Were Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REv. 215, 257-59 (1995) (arguing that
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rigid to prevent judicial manipulation, yet flexible enough to accommo-
date the competing individual and governmental interests at stake.2 °2
Before outlining this proposed test, it is important to illustrate the weak-
nesses of the present test, manipulability and confusion. 0 3
1. Mixing Analysis or Balancing Analysis?
a. Mixing the Government's Interest with the Individual's
The courts have manipulated the balancing test to the point where each
side's interests now have become hopelessly entangled. The result has
been a mixing, rather than a balancing analysis. 2 4 For instance, in Acton,
redefining compelling need, a factor used to evaluate the government's
interest in the search, the Acton court defined compelling expansively as
any governmental interest which overcomes the individual's privacy inter-
est.205 In effect, this constitutes a balancing analysis, because for the gov-
ernment's need to be compelling it only must outweigh the individual's
interest.206 In other words, if the privacy interest is insignificant, then the
adding more factors and solidifying those factors in the balancing analysis is not conducive
to simplifying and clarifying this area of law).
202. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (introducing the purpose of the balanc-
ing analysis and explaining how Camara incorporated both interests in the balancing analy-
sis). But see Sundby, supra note 5, at 1763, 1765-66 (contending that by concentrating on
privacy in its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court allowed reasonableness and the bal-
ancing analysis to flourish).
203. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 (1967) (creating the
balancing analysis as a means to determine the reasonableness of a search) with New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (employing balancing analysis to conclude that
the reasonableness standard should be used to judge the constitutionality of a school
search). See Clancy supra note 28, at 608 (arguing that the balancing test fails to "identify
individual suspicion's proper role" in Fourth Amendment analysis); Strossen, supra note
68, at 1181 (criticizing the Court for employing the balancing test "according to a utilitarian
cost-benefit balancing calculus"); infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (criticizing Ac-
ton's definition of compelling because it uses a balancing analysis to determine if the gov-
ernment's need is compelling).
204. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1523 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2386 (1995) (mixing the private and governmental interests together to reach a conclu-
sion). The court ruled that the governmental and individual privacy interests "are inter-
twined in any analysis to a very high degree, for they are not separate little weights to be
put on a chemist's balance." Id.; cf Sundby, supra note 5, at 1790-91 (postulating that in
defining a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court anticipatorily incorporates the gov-
ernment's need for the search into that definition).
205. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995). Justice Scalia held
that what constitutes a compelling interest can not be distilled into a "fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern." Id. at 2394. But see supra note 139 (comparing in-
stances where the Court found that the government demonstrated a compelling need and
instances where the Court found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling
need).
206. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95; see Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 945 (stating his defi-
nition of balancing as "a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional question by identi-
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government's need also may be insignificant, yet still be compelling, as
long as it is equal to or greater than the privacy interest.2"7 Of course, the
converse also is true.20 s Therefore, compelling's floating quantum now is
derived directly from the privacy interest at stake.20 9 It is a reflection of
the privacy interest, as much as it is an indicator of the government's
actual need.
Furthermore, this new, elastic definition manifests the serious implica-
tion of irreversibly tipping the balancing' scale in the government's
favor.210 The Court expands the definition of compelling at a time when
fying interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of
constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests").
Of course, while Justice Scalia reasoned that compelling constituted no fixed quantum,
under the Acton definition, he must, nevertheless assign compelling some value in order to
determine whether it "justif[ies] the particular search at hand." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-
95. In this way, the Acton court definition of compelling satisfies Aleinikoff's definition:
the Court assigns values to identified interests and compares them. See Aleinikoff, supra
note 53, at 945.
207. See Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 945 (explaining the theoretical mechanics of bal-
ancing analysis); see also Sundby, supra note 5, at 1796-97 (arguing that, because of the
saliency of issues, such as illegal drugs, in modern society, the government usually en-
counters little difficulty in showing a compelling need to support the search). Professor
Sundby summarizes: "[w]ith a little imagination, even the lowly Vehicle Identification
Number can be made to sound as if it is crucial to civilized society." Id. at 1797. There-
fore, it is not hard to see that, equipped with the new definition of compelling, the govern-
ment can justify a search with an arguably unsubstantial showing of need.
208. See Sundby, supra note 5, at 1796-97. According to Justice Scalia's logic, if an
individual's expectation of privacy is extremely high and the intrusiveness of the search is
egregious, then the government's need for the search may still be compelling if the Court
determines that the government's need justifies the intrusion of the search, by outweighing
the individual's interest. However, this is rarely the case, because the courts usually can
employ various rationales to diminish the expectation of privacy and minimize the intru-
siveness of the search, thereby enabling the government's interest to vanquish the individ-
ual's. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (diminishing a vehicle
dismantling business owner's expectation of privacy because he knowingly entered a perva-
sively regulated trade).
209. See supra notes 207-08 (contending that the value attributed to the government's
interest may vary, but will directly relate to the individual's interest, and may always be
viewed higher); see also Aleinikoff, supra, note 53, at 945 (theorizing that the thinking
behind balancing focuses directly on the competing interests and forces a comparison).
Reading Professor Aleinikoff's terms together with Acton's new definition of compelling,
the Court must weigh each competing interests in order to make a comparison and dis-
cover whether the government interest outweighs the individual's privacy interest. See Ac-
ton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95. Therefore, as part of determining whether a compelling need
exists, the Court must assess the gravity of the privacy interest and the level of intrusion
that it sustains. Id. This results in intrexicably mixing the government and individual
interests.
210. See Schulhofer, supra note 91, at 107 (noting the government's nearly flawless suc-
cess rate in justifying administrative searches before the Court in the 1980s); Stuntz, supra
note 11, at 1035 (arguing that in deciding the constitutionality of regulatory inspections
"the government's side of the scale is always heavier").
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the current trend in jurisprudence and modern society is to diminish the
individual's expectation of privacy.211 Thus, in effect, the Court unneces-
sarily tips the balance in favor of the government by enlarging the defini-
tion of a compelling need, thereby theoretically allowing an insignificant
governmental interest to justify the search."12
Another serious implication of this definition of compelling is that the
balancing test, equipped with this definition, embodies circular logic. For
a search to be reasonable, the government's need for the search must
outweigh the privacy interest of the individual, and thus justify the intru-
sion that the search presents.2 13 Under Acton, a compelling need is one
in which the government's need for the search outweighs the individual's
211. See Sundby, supra note 5, at 1762-63 (arguing that the individual's privacy interest
and the government's interest are "dependent variables on a sliding scale: minimizing the
level of the privacy intrusion can help compensate for a weaker government justification").
Therefore, minimizing the individual's expectation of privacy necessarily increases the
scope of acceptable intrusions. Id. at 1762. He also observes the diminishing effect moder-
nity, technology, and the Court's decisions have had on individuals' expectation of privacy
in our society:
Technological and communication advances mean that much of everyday life is
now recorded by someone somewhere, whether it be credit records, banking
records, phone records, tax records, or even what videos we rent. We may want
to be left alone, but we realistically do not expect it to happen in any complete
sense .... [Furthermore,] as governmental and nongovernmental intrusions on
privacy expand, the scope of what one reasonably expects to be private corre-
spondingly becomes truncated. In other words... Fourth Amendment protec-
tions will shrink as our everyday expectations of privacy also diminish.
Id. at 1758-61; Strossen, supra note 68, at 1176 (contending that the Court consistently
undervalues individual privacy interests, while unnecessarily overstating the countervailing
law enforcement interests).
As these professors illustrate, the government can justify the challenged search in three
manners. First, the government can diminish the individual's privacy interest and find that
the government's interest outweighs it. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489
U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (finding that railway workers have a diminished expectation of privacy
because of the history of regulation in the industry). In Skinner, the Court upheld the
search because of the government's compelling need to prevent train accidents. Id. at 628.
Second, the Court can inflate the government's interest and find that this interest out-
weighs the individual's. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395 (finding a school district's desire to
curtail drug-related sports injuries and curb adolescent disruptions in school compelling).
Third, the Court can do both, thus providing a foolproof method of justifying the search
and the intrusion that it entails as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 684-85 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(castigating the majority for making a mockery of the Fourth Amendment by inflating the
governmental need while minimizing the intrusiveness of the search and the privacy expec-
tations of the individuals).
212. See Sundby, supra note 5, at 1762-63 (noting that reducing the expectation of pri-
vacy can compensate for a weak governmental interest); supra note 211 (explaining the
methods that the Court can use to justify a search).
213. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (balancing the inter-
ests of the government and private citizens to determine the reasonableness of the search).
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privacy interest and thus justifies the challenged search.214 Therefore, the
reasonableness standard and the government's compelling need are
equated.215 After Acton, a search is reasonable if the government dem-
onstrates a compelling need,216 and a compelling need is one which is in
effect reasonable-outweighing the privacy interest, and hence justifying
the search.217
b. Mixing the Individual's Interest with the Government's
Similarly mixing the analysis, the Acton majority, in evaluating the pri-
vacy interest of the individual, considered the intrusiveness of the
search.218 As in Skinner, the Acton Court initially recognized the tradi-
tional, constitutional privacy protection afforded to an individual in their
excretory function. 21 9 Nevertheless, the Court diminished this height-
ened privacy interest both by concluding that the student athlete volunta-
rily entered a sphere of regulation, 22° and by finding the intrusiveness of
214. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95; see supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (argu-
ing that this definition of compelling includes the privacy interest of the individual).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14 (revealing that reasonableness and a
compelling need are determined using the same test-whether they outweigh the individ-
ual privacy interest).
216. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96 (finding compelling the government's need for the
search and upholding the search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S.
602, 628 (1989) (same); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
670 (1989) (same).
217. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95. In effect, reasonableness is collapsed into the govern-
ment showing a compelling need, because both are defined as outweighing the individual's
privacy interest. Cf Sundby, supra note 5, at 1797-98 (asserting that the government
should have little difficulty showing a compelling need).
218. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
219. Id. at 2393; see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; Fried, supra note 5, at 487 (indicating the
elevated level of privacy that society yields to excretory functions).
220. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393; see supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining the
Court's rationale that when individuals voluntarily enter a zone of regulation they diminish
their expectation of privacy).
The Court's diminishment of students' rights sends a negative message to students, who
at this very formative age, are learning that our country and society are founded on notions
of freedom and liberty, notions expressly stated and insured to individuals in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (order denying petition for certiorari) (arguing that allowing a mass, suspi-
cionless, unannounced dog-sniffing drug search of all students in a school conveys the
wrong message to our nation's youth). Justice Brennan stated:
We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police and dogs
burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly
make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped to convey. I
would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: ... that before police
and local officers are permitted to conduct dog-assisted dragnet inspections of
public school students, they must obtain a warrant based on sufficient particular-
ized evidence to establish probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being
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the search minimal.22' While the athlete does voluntarily "go out for the
team," she does not dictate the form of search used by the state.222 In
other words, because the intrusiveness of the search is a variable com-
pletely dependent on the government's choice of search methods, this
factor should not be used to evaluate the individual's interest in the bal-
ancing analysis.223 Here again, the Court has convoluted the analysis of
each side's interest.224 Therefore, the balancing test remains a balance in
form, not substance.225
committed. Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citi-
zenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental princi-
ples underpinning our constitutional freedoms.
Id.; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 385-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens similarly
described the possible effect of the T.L.O. majority's opinion:
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the
power of government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from
schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they
take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals is the one contained in
the Fourth Amendment: that the government may not intrude on the personal
privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court's
decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's youth.
Id.; see also Fried, supra note 5, at 479 (explicating that respect embodies an attitude oblig-
ing persons to observe the constraints of morality when dealing with each other). Conse-
quently, "[s]elf-respect is, then, the attitude by which a person believes himself to be
entitled to be treated by other persons in accordance with the principle of morality."
Fried, supra note 5, at 479. Hence, the Court's disregard for student privacy rights reveals
a disdain for students' rights: a disdain that could potentially damage student's self-respect.
221. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393;
222. Id. at 2389-90. Athletes could not choose the form or procedure of the drug test-
ing used. Id. Because the school employed random and suspicionless testing, the athlete
had no way of altering his or her behavior to avoid being compelled to submit to the drug
test. See Sundby, supra note 5, at 1768 (noting that "[o]nce the analysis changes to the
reasonableness test's balancing of a proffered government interest against an individual's
privacy interest.., the individual loses much of her ability to control the right to intrude").
Professor Sundby also aptly observes that the only way to avoid the intrusiveness of the
search is to "forego[ ] what is otherwise a legitimate activity." Id.
223. See supra note 222 (explaining how the individual, in the circumstance of a suspi-
cionless search, has absolutely no control of the intrusiveness of the search).
224. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (describing the Court's mixing of
the government's interest with the individual's, by including the individual's privacy inter-
est in the definition of the government's interest); supra notes 218-23 and accompanying
text (explaining how the Court unnecessarily mixes the individual interest with the
government's).
225. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1523-27 (9th Cir. 1994) (mixing the
private and governmental interests together to reach their conclusion), vacated, 115 S. Ct.
2386 (1995); see supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court
tends to mix each side's interests before balancing them).
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2. Balancing Analysis Sliding down the Slippery Slope
The Court also has manipulated the balancing test by steadily ex-
tending it from one type of search to the next.226 While this represents a
fundamental feature of the common law, the Court ignores the impor-
tance of tracing the results involved in extending rationales to analogous,
or not so analogous cases. 227
For example, in ruling that the individual athletes had a diminished
expectation of privacy, the Acton court relied heavily on Skinner,228
which itself had relied heavily on the closely regulated industry line of
cases.229 In the early closely regulated industry cases, to uphold a search,
the Court explained that the employer-entrepreneur had a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy because he and his business voluntarily entered the
sphere of regulation.23 ° However, the challenged search concentrated on
the industry, not the employee.231 In Skinner, the Court, analogizing to
the closely regulated industries cases, found the individual's privacy inter-
est diminished, despite the fact that the employee, not the industry or
employer, was the object of the search.232 Besides this discrepancy, the
Court also did not require a warrant or any form of individualized suspi-
cion in the search in Skinner because of the threat of extensive loss of
human life.233
226. See supra notes 45-108 and accompanying text (analyzing the administrative
searches cases in which the Court has used the balancing test and reasonableness standard
to evaluate the constitutionality of these searches).
227. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-39 (1967) (engendering
the balancing test and requiring a warrant without probable cause in order to conduct a
rather routine municipal housing inspection) with United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 537, 544 (1985) (using the balancing test from Camara and holding that no
warrant or probable cause was required to detain a woman suspected of alimentary canal
smuggling for a sixteen-hour period, in which the police detained her in a small room to
monitor her bowel movements).
228. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995) (citing Skinner in sup-
port of holding that a student athlete has a diminished expectation of privacy).
229. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (concluding
that railroad workers have a diminished expectation of privacy because they constitute a
focus of regulatory concern).
230. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (ruling that a businessman
should expect inspections of his business records when he enters a pervasively regulated
industry, such as the ammunition and gun industry); see supra note 55-61 (discussing the
closely regulated industry cases and their rationales).
231. See French, supra note 92, at 149 (distinguishing the closely regulated industry
cases from Skinner, because in those cases the object of the search was the industry).
232. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628; see French, supra note 92, at 149 (contending that Skin-
ner incorrectly applies the rationale of the closely regulated industry cases).
233. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-33 (ruling that no warrant or any form of suspicion is
required to compel a railway worker to submit to a urinalysis). The Court departed from
earlier case law by failing to require at least an administrative warrant. See See v. City of
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Similarly in Acton, the Court, analogizing the athlete to the employee
in Skinner, found the drug testing at issue reasonable without requiring
individualized suspicion or a warrant.234 Acton, however, does not follow
logically from these prior cases.235 First, the Acton Court incorrectly re-
lied on Skinner, when it allowed the search without a warrant or any form
of individualized suspicion.236 Unlike Skinner, the facts in Acton
presented no significant chance of a catastrophe resulting in an extensive
loss of life.237 Second, as mentioned, Acton analogized the athlete to the
railroad employee in Skinner.2 38 This is problematic because Skinner im-
properly analogized the employee to the employer in the closely regu-
lated industry cases.239 Therefore, what began with the early closely
regulated industry cases allowing the search of an industry for regulatory
violations steadily has been manipulated into justifying the search of an
adolescent athlete's urine under the close supervision of a state official.2 4°
While this trend alone is alarming, the fact that these searches usually are
founded upon strong publicly-supported objectives compounds the
problem.2
41
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (requiring a warrant supported by less than probable
cause for a search of a commercial business place).
234. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393-94 (1995); see supra notes 158-
62 and accompanying text (analyzing the various rationales supporting the Court's ruling
that athletes have a lowered expectation of privacy).
235. See infra notes 236-40 and accompanying text (revealing the incongruencies be-
tween the closely regulated industry cases, Skinner and Acton).
236. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393-94.
237. Id. at 2400-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor notes that no great
threat of harm existed in Acton and further that the urinalysis presented a significant intru-
sion to student's privacy. Id. at 2402.
238. Id. at 2393. This analogy objectively is reasonable because the railroad employee
and the athlete were similarly the focus of regulation. Id.; Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec-
utives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
239. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
240. Compare See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (requiring a municipal
inspector to obtain an administrative warrant to inspect a merchant's store) with Acton,
115 S. Ct. at 2396 (upholding a warrantless, suspicionless, state-mandated urinalysis).
241. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(warning that threats to liberty often are generated by benevolent purposes); supra note
197 (providing quotes from Supreme Court Justices regarding the fact that civil liberties
often suffer during times of perceived crisis in our country).
From an overall Fourth Amendment standpoint, applying the balancing test to any non-
criminal search has engendered a perverse double standard within the Fourth Amendment.
Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1057-58. Compare Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326 (1987)
(holding a warrantless search unconstitutional in a criminal investigation context, where a
police officer moved stereo equipment several inches to ascertain the registration number
on the stereo) with Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (upholding a school district requiring an
adolescent, without a warrant or a modicum of suspicion, to urinate into a container in the
presence of a state official).
1996] 1087/
Catholic University Law Review
3. Promoting Confusion: The Ubiquitous Use of Balancing within
Fourth Amendment Analysis
Additionally, the multiple uses of the balancing analysis promotes con-
fusion and inconsistency within Fourth Amendment analysis.242 The
Court has used balancing to determine "the definition of a search,243 the
reasonableness of a search,2 " the reasonableness of a seizure,245 the
meaning of probable cause,246 [and] the level of suspicion required to
support stops and detentions., 247 From this ubiquity, confusion inevita-
bly resulted. To this multitude of uses, the Acton Court added yet an-
other use of balancing: the determination of whether the government
established a compelling need for the search.248 Thus, the balancing test's
multiplicity fosters confusion and allows the Court to manipulate its
analysis.249
242. E.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 473, 475 (1991) (arguing that the case-by-case deci-
sionmaking of the Court has left it "mired in confusion and contradiction"); Brian J. Serr,
Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN.
L. REv. 583, 587 (1989) (contending that the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence "is
misguided and inconsistent"); Strossen, supra note 68, at 1195 (criticizing the Court for
distorting the balancing test).
Compare New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (upholding a school search
based upon reasonable suspicion after employing balancing analysis to determine whether
or not to use the reasonableness standard) (emphasis added) with Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390
(upholding a suspicionless, school search after using the balancing analysis to ascertain the
reasonableness of the search) (emphasis added).
243. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (balancing the privacy interest
in luggage against the intrusiveness of a "canine sniff" and concluding no search occurred
under the Fourth Amendment).
244. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (balancing the individual's interest in
privacy and security against the community's interest in law enforcement to determine
reasonableness).
245. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (judging the
reasonableness of a seizure by balancing the legitimate government interests against the
intrusiveness inflicted by the search).
246. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967).
247. Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 965 (providing cases explained in notes 242-47); see
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
248. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995); see supra notes 204-
17 (criticizing the Court for using balancing in this manner).
249. See Hemphill, supra note 201, at 242-46 (contending that the balancing analysis is
applied in an ad hoc fashion and enables the executive branch of government to extend the
limits of its power); supra note 242 (regarding the inconsistency and confusion caused by
the Court's increasing reliance on balancing analysis to resolve Fourth Amendment issues).
Theoretically, in analyzing a single search incident, the Court could employ balancing anal-
ysis to determine: whether a search had occurred, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-
07 (1983), whether to use the reasonableness standard, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341 (1985), whether the government demonstrated a compelling need supporting the
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B. Consistency of Privacy Treatment under the Bill of Rights:
Proposing a Different Test
Despite the Fourth Amendment's position in the Bill of Rights,250 the
Court has been reluctant to treat it like other fundamental rights.25'
While courts use strict judicial scrutiny to review governmental impinge-
ments on these rights,252 they do not necessarily use the same level of
scrutiny to protect Fourth Amendment rights.253 Therefore, to restore its
vigor, the Fourth Amendment needs to be treated consistently with other
fundamental rights.254
search, Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95, and whether the search itself was reasonable,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987).
250. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV; see LASSON, supra note 2, at 83 (contending that the
Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment "in response to a wide clamor for a bill of rights"
and further contending that the Fourth Amendment represents "one of the more impor-
tant rights").
251. See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1016-17 (asserting that criminal procedure is treated
as a self-contained system, interrelating minimally with other areas of constitutional law);
see generally Amar, supra note 46, at 758 (arguing that law professors add to this erroneous
treatment by failing to teach the Fourth Amendment as part of Constitutional Law).
252. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (holding that a
state must show that it has a compelling interest in restricting the sale of contraceptives to
persons over the age of eighteen and that the means chosen are narrowly tailored to effec-
tuate that interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1972) (deciding that only where a
State showg a compelling government interest may a statute banning abortion be upheld);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1968) (ruling that a miscegenation statute must pass the
"'most rigid scrutiny' "to be constitutional) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965) (White, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (stating that the Connecticut statute banning the use of contraception by
married couples must pass "a substantial burden of justification" by showing an interest
"which is compelling"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (subjecting
the government's regulations forcing citizens of Japanese descent to relocate "to the most
rigid scrutiny"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a state statute
requiring sterilization after a certain number of criminal offenses must pass "strict scru-
tiny"); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.3 (5th ed.
1995) (explaining the strict scrutiny test).
253. See Hemphill, supra note 201, at 245-46 (arguing that "the government is given
great deference in Fourth Amendment cases," whereas in other constitutional cases, the
government often must pass strict scrutiny). Therefore, the author concludes that the right
of privacy fares better as a fundamental right in the context of other amendments, than it
does under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
254. See Amar, supra note 46, at 758 (observing that the Fourth Amendment should be
treated as other Amendments because, "unlike the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments,
which specially apply in criminal contexts, the Fourth Amendment applies equally to civil
and criminal law enforcement"); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1048 (suggesting that criminal
procedure may be a vehicle for substantive due process). Indeed, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, the Fourth Amendment does apply equally in both the civil and criminal
context. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). However, the purpose of
the search does, in reality, affect how the Court treats the Fourth Amendment and its
constitutional protections. See supra note 38 (observing how the purpose of the search
affects the Court's decisionmaking).
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The right of privacy is a substantive, fundamental right, and thus should
be treated as one under the Fourth Amendment when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of administrative searches.255 To promote consistency,
courts should apply the balancing analysis used in substantive due process
and equal protection cases to determine the constitutionality of Fourth
Amendment administrative searches. 256
This proposed test, however, should be used only in place of the cur-
rent balancing test, and should not replace the entire Fourth Amendment
analytical framework.257 Under this proposed test, the Court still must
determine first whether a search falls under the command of the Fourth
Therefore, because there is a bifurcated treatment of criminal and civil searches under
the Fourth Amendment and because this Note focuses only on those with an administra-
tive purpose, this Note does not seek to challenge the warrant-probable cause requirement
that usually is demanded for a criminal search to be constitutionally permissible. See Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that, notwithstanding the few excep-
tions to the rule, a criminal search without a warrant was "per se unreasonable"); Stuntz,
supra note 11, at 1057-58 (observing this bifurcated treatment and its consequential per-
verse result). Instead, this Note attacks the current balancing test used by the Court to
judge searches with administrative purposes. See supra notes 199-249 (noting the defects
of the current balancing test).
The insufficient protection the Fourth Amendment provides in administrative search sit-
uations becomes evident when compared to other privacy cases under the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant-probable cause requirement. the Fifth Amendment, or the Fourteenth
Amendment. Compare Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (requiring probable
cause, and thus protecting the privacy interest of the defendant after the police moved a
stereo several inches to examine the registration number) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978) (invalidating a statute that prohibited marriage if an individual
failed to satisfy his child support payments, thus protecting the right to marry as inherent in
the right of privacy) with Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395 (1995) (justify-
ing the invasion of the privacy interest of adolescent athletes because the Court found the
government's interest in preventing high school sports injuries caused by drug use
compelling).
255. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 730 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
that "[i]t is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484-86 (opining that the Fourth Amendment, among other Amendments, has penumbras
which collectively constitute a right of privacy); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)
(recognizing that the Fourth Amendment creates a "right to privacy, no less important
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people"); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Fourth
Amendment encompasses "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men").
256. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing Mischief of
Camera and Terry, 72 MiNN. L. REV. 383, 431 (1988) (advocating the use of a strict scrotiny
standard, instead of the reasonableness balancing test); infra notes 257-303 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the application and the benefits of applying substantive due process
balancing test in the context of Fourth Amendment administrative searches).
257. See supra notes 109-120 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's
current analytical framework for administrative searches).
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Amendment. 58 If the Fourth Amendment applies, the Court must deter-
mine whether the special needs exception applies, because that exception
allows the Court to use the reasonableness standard to analyze the consti-
tutionality of the search.259 If the reasonableness standard does apply,
then the Court should next apply the balancing test used in substantive
due process and equal protection cases.2 6 ° While this approximates the
current balancing test, it arguably affords more protection to individual
privacy interests.
At this point, the Court must analyze the gravity of the individual's
privacy interest implicated by the search, irrespective of the government's
need in performing the search. 261 Because of the breadth of privacy pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment and the Amendment's position
258. See Alonso, supra note 53, at 665-69 (stating that a "search is a governmental
invasion of a person's privacy"); supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (explaining the
Court's analysis in determining whether government action constitutes a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
259. See supra note 33 (discussing the various formulations of the special needs excep-
tion). If the special needs exception is not satisfied, or if the search's purpose is criminal,
the warrant and probable cause test should be used, notwithstanding the existence of one
of a growing number of exceptions to this rule. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
212-13 (1979) (rejecting balancing analysis in the context of a criminal arrest); Bradley,
supra note 33, at 1473-74 (providing an extensive list of exceptions to the warrant or prob-
able cause requirements); Knopp, supra note 53, at 692 (listing the prominent exceptions
to the warrant requirement). For instance, exigent circumstances, plain view, inventory
searches, and border searches all represent exceptions to the warrant requirement. Knopp,
supra note 53, at 692.
260. See infra notes 261-303 and accompanying text (explaining how this test should
work and the benefits it presents in the Fourth Amendment setting).
261. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625-628 (1989)
(evaluating the individual's privacy interest before the government's in ascertaining
whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977) (determining the individual's privacy right before the government's
interest in determining whether government regulation violated the individual's right of
privacy). For proper balancing to occur, it is imperative that the Court evaluate each side
separately, determining each side's actual weights, and then, only after this is done, balance
the factors. Cf Sundby, supra note 5, at 1791 (criticizing the Court for allowing the gov-
ernment's need to affect the Court's evaluation of the individual's privacy interest).
It should also be noted that at this point in the analysis there must be some quantum of a
reasonable privacy interest in existence or the constitutional analysis of the search would
not have proceeded to this level. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (ruling that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left by the curb, and therefore
denying the individual the protections of the Fourth Amendment). In other words, the
Court has already determined that a privacy interest exists in determining whether the
government action constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes
109-11 and accompanying text (explaining that this is the first step in the analytical frame-
work established by the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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within the Bill of Rights,262 it could be argued that the Fourth Amend-
ment creates a fundamental right of privacy for individuals.263 However,
assuming that the Fourth Amendment does provide a fundamental right
of privacy, this still does not guarantee the protection of strict judicial
scrutiny.26 Instead, the Court applies strict scrutiny only when the gov-
ernment significantly intrudes upon such a right.265 Therefore, the focus
of the Court's analysis should be the intrusiveness of the government's
search.266
262. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides the people "securfity]
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Id. Arguably, these four areas of protection cover every search imaginable.
263. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that the Fourth and the
Fifth Amendments create a zone of privacy "against unreasonable searches and seizures").
Some may criticize this argument because it potentially could produce an unnecessarily
broad definition of privacy as a fundamental right, in that the Fourth Amendment and its
four express areas of protection cover every search imaginable. See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 99 (1990) (criticizing the Warren Court for creating a right of
privacy). The author further criticizes both the Warren Court for failing to provide param-
eters to this newly created right and the Burger and Rehnquist courts for allowing this
right to mature into an established right. Id. at 110; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 252, § 11.7, at 401 n.16 (citing authorities that criticize the Court for recognizing a
right of privacy that does not exist in the constitutional text); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendments Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1971) (asserting that
the Court created the right of privacy in an unprincipled manner, thereby creating a funda-
mental right lacking definition and scope). However, as this Note argues, the key to this
analysis is not the right of privacy, which the Court has recognized for the past thirty years,
but the degree of intrusiveness inflicted by the government's search. See infra notes 269-73
and accompanying text (arguing that the government must pass strict judicial scrutiny if the
government's search significantly interferes with an individual's right of privacy).
264. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1986) (rejecting the heightened scrutiny
standard because the challenged food stamp program did not substantially and directly
burden a fundamental right); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1978) (upholding provi-
sions of the Social Security Act as rational because they did not interfere with the right to
marry inherent in the right to privacy); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978)
(opining that rigorous judicial scrutiny should only be used to analyze a regulation that
substantially and directly interferes with a fundamental right); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599-600, 603 (1977) (upholding New York statute because it did not significantly im-
pair the individual's right to privacy).
265. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387-91 (applying heightened scrutiny to a statute that signifi-
cantly interfered with the right to marry inherent in the right to privacy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (adhering to a similar definition as in Stanley, except substi-
tuting the word "unwarranted" for "unwanted"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (defining fundamental right of privacy as "right to be free ... from unwanted gov-
ernmental intrusions into one's privacy).
266. See supra notes 119-20 (explaining that under the current analytical framework the
Court examines the intrusiveness of the search in determining its reasonableness); supra
note 261 (explaining that, for the courts to proceed with their analysis of the search under
the Fourth Amendment, some right to privacy must exist); cf Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (ruling that briefly detaining a passing motorist is
minimally intrusive).
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Under the substantive due process and equal protection cases protect-
ing the right of privacy, the Court determines whether the government
"significantly interferes" with the exercise of the privacy right.2 67 In do-
ing so, the Court looks at whether the government action directly and
substantially interferes with the right of privacy.268 Thus, the Court
should apply this test to the intrusiveness of the search to determine
whether the search constitutes significant interference.
If the intrusiveness of the search does constitute significant interfer-
ence, then the government's search must pass strict judicial scrutiny to be
upheld. 269 To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must meet two re-
quirements.27° The government must show that it had a compelling inter-
est for performing the search and that the search method used was
narrowly tailored to achieve this compelling interest.271 To determine
whether the government's interest in conducting the search constitutes a
compelling one, the Court should analyze the government's proffered in-
terest without making any comparisons to the privacy interest of the indi-
vidual.272 To satisfy the "narrowly tailored" requirement, the
267. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (1978) (holding that a Wisconsin statute "significantly
interfere[d]" with the right to marry and therefore must pass strict scrutiny to satisfy con-
stitutional muster). Note that the right to marry inheres in the right to privacy. Id. at 386.
268. Id. at 387. Justice Marshall stated that significant interference does not occur,
where the government's regulation does not place a "direct legal obstacle in the path" of
individuals seeking to exercise their right to marry. Id. at 387 n.12. The negative implica-
tion of this statement is that significant interference occurs where the government does, in
fact, erect a direct legal obstacle, preventing the individual from fully exercising a funda-
mental right. See id. However, this "direct legal obstacle" standard is unsuitable for the
Fourth Amendment because any government search poses a direct legal obstacle to an
individual's right of privacy.
269. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (acknowledging that gov-
ernment restrictions that "curtail the civil rights of a single racial group" are not per se
unconstitutional, but instead must pass "rigid scrutiny").
270. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
271. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). Justice Brennan con-
cluded that" '[c]ompelling' is of course the key word" and regulations representing alleged
compelling interests "must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests." Id. Nar-
rowly tailored also has been stated as "closely tailored." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
While neither Carey or Zablocki involve searches under the Fourth Amendment, these
cases are used to demonstrate how the strict scrutiny test operates in balancing the govern-
ment's and individual's interests. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (theo-
rizing that the balancing test used in substantive due process and equal protection cases
should be used in Fourth Amendment analysis instead of the current balancing analysis).
272. But see Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394-95 (1995) (ruling that a
government interest reaches a compelling level when it justifies the intrusion inflicted upon
the individual's privacy interest). Under the proposed test, the Acton Court's definition of
compelling will not be used because it improperly mixes the government's interest and the
privacy interest, and as such, fails to provide a proper and accurate balance of interests.
See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text (criticizing the Acton Court's new definition
of compelling).
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government must show that no other less intrusive search alternatives ex-
isted, such as using individualized suspicion, in executing its compelling
purpose.273 If the intrusiveness of the search does not reach the level of
significant interference, then the search merely must pass the rational ba-
sis test.274 To do so, the government must only show that it had a legiti-
mate purpose in conducting the search and that the search was rationally
related to this purpose.275 Moreover, the government need not be con-
cerned with whether other less intrusive alternatives to the challenged
search existed, as this is not a factor in a rational basis analysis.276
C. Exemplifying the Effects of the Proposed Test: Applying this Test to
Acton and Martinez-Fuerte
Applying the proposed test to Vernonia School District v. Acton and
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte demonstrates how this proposed test will
work in administrative search cases. If the Court employed the proposed
test in Acton, the Court would have subjected the school's urinalysis pro-
gram to strict scrutiny and the urinalysis program arguably would have
failed.277 First, James Acton had a fundamental right of privacy protect-
273. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 252, § 14.3, at 602 (noting that, in demonstrating
the close relationship needed to establish the "narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny,
the Court usually will only accept means absolutely needed to achieve the alleged compel-
ling purpose). In other words, if the government action is underinclusive or overinclusive,
then the government action fails to be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling purpose.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 390-91 (concluding that the challenged statute was both underinclu-
sive and overinclusive and thus was not narrowly tailored to advance the government's
interests).
274. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83
(1978) (holding that, where government regulation does not significantly touch upon a
fundamental right, the Court uses the minimum scrutiny standard of review); Zablocki, 434
U.S. at 386-87 (implying that if a government regulation does not significantly interfere
with the right of privacy, then a legitimate regulation may be imposed by the State); No-
WAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 252, §§ 11.4, 14.3 (explaining the rational relationship test in
the context of substantive due process and equal protection).
275. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 252, §§ 11.4, 14.3.
276. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) (affording
state officials a presumption of validity in choosing search methods, thereby not requiring
them to utilize the least restrictive means); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
556-57 n.12 (1976) (rejecting defendants' theory that less-restrictive-alternatives could be
employed, because requiring the least restrictive means "could raise insuperable barriers to
the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers"); see also infra notes 292-98 (apply-
ing the rational basis test to Martinez-Fuerte).
277. See infra notes 278-89 (arguing that under the proposed test, the search in Acton
would have to pass the strict scrutiny test and would have failed because the urinalysis
program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its purported objectives of preventing drug
related injuries and deterring drug usage).
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ing his excretory functions, regardless of his participation in athletics.278
Second, the search method and the subsequent analysis of the athlete's
urine significantly interfered with his right of privacy in his bodily integ-
rity.279 The state-mandated urinalysis directly interfered with the ath-
lete's excretory function, in that the state both compelled the athlete to
urinate in the presence of a state official and consequently possessed the
urine for the purpose of drug testing.28 ° In addition, the urinalysis sub-
stantially interfered with the athlete's right of privacy, because the ana-
lyzed urine provided private information regarding the individual to the
state.28'
278. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995) (noting that the
"'excretory function [is] traditionally shielded by great privacy' ") (quoting Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)); Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist.,
23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "[niormal locker room or restroom
activities are a far cry from having an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the
results of one's urination"), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); see Fried, supra, note 5, at 487
(observing that American society affords the excretory functions "more or less absolute
privacy").
279. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating "state-compelled,
state-monitored collection and testing of urine, while perhaps not the most intrusive of
searches, is still 'particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity' ")
(quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that state
compelled surgery to recover a bullet is severely intrusive and unconstitutional); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576-77 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the invasive and
humiliating nature of a visual body-cavity search in which the prison inmate must "display
the anal cavity for inspection by a correctional officer" and must allow officials to inspect
their genitals); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (stating that taking a scraping
sample from under defendant's fingernails was a severe intrusion); Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (holding that the Constitution does not allow substantial in-
trusions into an individual's body); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(concluding that forcing a man to vomit in order to obtain incriminating evidence "shocks
the conscience").
280. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (noting that a school monitor observes the student
while the student is urinating); see Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525 (concluding that "students[ ] do
not have to surrender their right to privacy in order to secure their right to participate in
athletics"), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). In other words, the "bare" nature of athletics
and high school locker rooms does not negate the invasive and disturbing aspects of urinat-
ing in the presence of a state official. Id.; see Fried, supra note 5, at 487 (noting the
anguish and loss of self-esteem occasioned by a privacy invasion upon the excretory func-
tions of an individual); Piniak, supra note 129, at 6D (explaining the embarrassing and
humiliating aspects of a urinalysis procedure based on her own experiences in a public high
school); see also supra note 129 (detailing the testing procedure).
281. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. Justice Scalia found this to be inconsequential, because
the tests aimed at discovering drug traces. Id. at 2393-94. However, other information
could easily be obtained from the search, such as pregnancy or diabetes, and in fact, the
school's testing policy forced the athlete to disgorge any medications that she was currently
taking. Id. at 2393-94.
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Because it would constitute a significant interference, the school's drug
testing policy would have to pass the strict scrutiny test.282 Under this
test,*the policy would not have prevailed.283 Even assuming that the
state's interest, preventing athletic injuries and deterring drug use
amounted to a compelling interest,2" the state would not have been able
to demonstrate that it narrowly tailored its testing policy to achieve its
objectives. First, a search without individualized suspicion necessarily is
not the least intrusive alternative possible.285 Second, if the school in-
tended to prevent drug-induced injuries and to deter drug use in the
schools, the policy the school implemented exhibited both underinclu-
siveness and overinclusiveness.286 Specifically, the policy is underinclu-
sive because it pertains exclusively to athletes and does not include other
students, who according to the school's testimony, contributed to the
drug problem.287 The policy also is overinclusive because it invades the
privacy of an overwhelming majority of student athletes who were not
suspected of drug use.288 Therefore, Vernonia's policy failed to be nar-
rowly tailored to deterring drug use, in the sense that, it tested innocent
athletes, while it allowed suspected drug users to remain free of
testing.289
282. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 252, § 14.3 (explaining strict scrutiny); supra
notes 269-73 and accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny test).
283. See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text (explaining how Vernonia's policy
would fail the strict scrutiny test because it exhibited both overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness).
284. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (holding that compel-
ling is the "key word"). Under this test, the government rarely has been able to override
the individual's interest. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944)
(holding that the government's interest in national security during a time of war was com-
pelling and outweighed the individual's interest); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
99-100 (1943) (holding the same).
285. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (acknowledging that the search used may not have been
the least intrusive method possible).
286. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978) (ruling that because a statute was
both underinclusive and overinclusive it was not closely tailored to achieving its stated
goals); see infra notes 287-89 (demonstrating how the closely tailored requirement of the
strict scrutiny standard would invalidate the search scheme adopted by the school district).
287. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
school reports did not exclusively confine suspected drug use to athletes, but instead in-
cluded a teacher spotting "students smoking marijuana during the school day at a coffee
shop"), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
288. See Daniels, supra note 144, at Al (noting that the school "did not suspect James
Acton of drug use").
289. See supra notes 286-88 (explaining how the policy fails to be closely tailored). The
school district did not test those students who it individually suspected of drug use. Id. at
2403; see supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting the irony that the school district
identified specific instances of student drug use in supporting its argument that a drug
problem existed at the school and yet implemented a suspicionless drug testing scheme).
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Nevertheless, using the proposed test would not drastically change the
judicial landscape of the Fourth Amendment.29 ° For example, had the
Court applied this test to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte291 the outcome
of that case would not have changed.2 92 In Martinez-Fuerte, the check-
point established by the government did not significantly interfere with
the motorists right of privacy.29 3 Hence, the government would have had
to pass the rational basis test, demonstrating a legitimate purpose and a
rational relationship between that purpose and the established check-
point. 94 Preventing illegal aliens from entering the country constitutes a
legitimate governmental purpose.295 Similarly, establishing a checkpoint
on a highway on which these aliens entered the country was rationally
related to achieving the governmental purpose. 96 Moreover, the govern-
ment, as was noted in Martinez-Fuerte, did not have to utilize the least
intrusive alternative. 97 Thus, using the rational basis test in Martinez-
Fuerte, the same result would have been reached: the Court would have
upheld the search.298
290. See infra notes 292-98 and accompanying text (illustrating that applying the pro-
posed test to the facts in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), would not
change the outcome of that case).
291. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
292. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (explaining the facts and rationales
in this case).
293. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-560. The stop in Martinez-Fuerte amounted to a
very brief stop, while the motorist remained in her car. Id. at 558. Thus, while the stop
directly interfered with the motorist's right of privacy, it did not substantially interfere with
the privacy right. Id. at 557-58; see supra note 67 (explaining the small degree of intrusive-
ness presented by checkpoint stops). Comparing the brief detention in Martinez-Fuerte to
a urinalysis accentuates the fact that the search in Martinez-Fuerte did not constitute sub-
stantial interference. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (categorizing a urinalysis as a "type of search particularly
destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity").
294. See supra note 274-76 and accompanying text (explaining the rational basis test).
295. See supra note 65-66 and accompanying text (noting that the Court upheld the
checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte because it served a legitimate government purpose that out-
weighed the privacy interest implicated by the search).
296. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554 (ruling that the record of the checkpoint dem-
onstrates its effectiveness).
297. Id. at 556 n.12.
298. See supra notes 290-97 (hypothesizing that the result would have been no different
in Martinez-Fuerte if the balancing test used in substantive due process analysis had been
utilized). Obviously, this test will be fairly easy to pass, and therefore will allow the state
sufficient latitude to execute effective law enforcement. See NOWAK & ROrUNDA, supra
note 252, § 11.4, at 383 (noting that courts defer to legislative decisionmaking under the
rational relationship test).
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D. Benefits of this Test
This test adequately accommodates both side's interests by providing a
more categorical and rigid approach to the Fourth Amendment analysis
of administrative searches. 299 It adequately protects the individual's in-
terest,, by forcing the government to pass the strict scrutiny test, when it
significantly interferes with the individual's fundamental right of pri-
vacy.3"' This balancing test fosters protection because it forces the gov-
ernment to use individualized suspicion, thereby enabling the individual
to dictate when he or she will be subjected to a governmental search.30 1
In turn, this proposed test allows the individual to pursue legitimate activ-
ities, such as high school athletics without the threat of unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusions.30 2 Conversely, where the government does not
significantly interfere with the individual's privacy right, this test allows
the government wide latitude in pursuing legitimate administrative needs
inherent in our modem, expansive government.30 3 Thus, the substantive
due process balancing test provides a more accurate balance than the test
the Court currently uses and promotes consistency in decisions regarding
the fundamental right of privacy.
299. Strossen, supra note 68, at 1176 (arguing that the balancing test needs to be more
rigid). The proposed test also accommodates the least intrusive alternative as a factor, as
Professor Strossen contends it should. Id. at 1176-77.
300. Cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (explaining that, when a govern-
ment regulation significantly interferes with a fundamental right, the regulation must be
closely tailored to effectuate its purpose in order to pass constitutional muster). Note,
however, that the strict scrutiny test still allows the government to override the individual's
interests in some instances; in this way, the government's interest remains accommodated.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (concluding that, even under
strict scrutiny, the government's interest in national security outweighed the individual's
interest in equal protection).
301. Sundby, supra note 5, at 1768 (arguing that the only way to avoid a suspicionless
search is to avoid pursuing the legitimate activity that the search encompasses); see gener-
ally Strossen, supra note 68, at 1238-67 (presenting the advantages and disadvantages of
including least intrusive means in the constitutional analysis).
302. Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995). The school did not
allow James Acton to participate on the football team, until he signed the drug-testing
consent form. Id.
303. See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 1029 (arguing that the modern administrative state
requires information, information that is usually private). This test still accommodates the
individual's interest, allowing the individual to show that the government's search is not
rationally related to its stated objective. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985) (holding that the government failed to meet the rational basis test,
because its stated rationale was not rationally related to its alleged objectives); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (ruling that the Alaska dividend distribution plan failed




In Acton, the Court sends the Nation's youth a strong message. While
informing student athletes that their privacy rights are diminished, the
Court also rules that the performance of state-monitored urinalyses is
minimally intrusive. Intensifying this message, the Court, through its new
elastic definition of compelling, gives the government broad laiitude to
inflate its interests in conducting searches. In doing so, the Court ensures
the current judicial trend of justifying significant government intrusions
upon individual privacy.
To stop this trend, the balancing test used in other areas of constitu-
tional law has been proposed as a worthy alternative to the current analy-
sis. Under this test, the Court will perform an actual balancing analysis,
evaluating each side's interests, without mixing the two, and then deter-
mining which side's interest outweighs the other. Furthermore, using the
proposed test allows individualized suspicion once again to be a factor in
the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis. Finally, this test provides suffi-
cient rigidity to insure that the Court will not be able to manipulate it,
and thus will not be able to inflate improperly the government's interest,
while unfairly minimizing the individual's interest. In this way, the pro-
posed test promotes consistency in the treatment of the right of privacy
and frustrates the current assault on the individual's privacy rights that
the growing, pervasive administrative state in our society poses.
Marc A. Stanislawczyk
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